Auteur archieven: Frank Vandenbroucke
Vergeet de oude schema’s over de staatshervorming
SURE: first step towards European unemployment re-insurance?
SURE: first step towards European unemployment re-insurance?
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Centralisering van EU-beleid infectieziekten kan op steun rekenen
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SURE : A welcome lynchpin for a European unemployment re-insurance
SOCIAL EUROPE POLICY PAPER NO 251 APRIL 2020 #SOLIDARITY #COVID-19 #HEALTH #EMPLOYMENT SUR A WELCO FOR E UNEMPL RE-INSU ▪ SOFIA FERNANDES Senior Research Fellow Jacques Delors Institute in Paris FRANK VANDENBROUCKE Professor at the University of Amsterdam & Advisor to This paper expands upon/ “The European Commission’s SURE initiative and euro area unemployment re-insurance” by Frank Vandenbroucke László Andor Roel Beetsma Brian Burgoon Georg Fischer Theresa Kuhn Chris Luigjes Francesco Nicoli VoxEU 6 April The authors would like thank Klervi Kerneïs for her work as research assistant Abstract On 9 EU finance ministers enlarged Eurogroup (with eight countries which are not members area) agreed least principle implement a pan-European support system national short-time schemes proposed Commission We will discuss relationship between this proposal idea unem- ployment re-insurance scheme also refers its communication on Rather than an “unemployment (re)insurance scheme” first-order effect is above all “job insurance explain why against backdrop sharp contraction caused public-health res- ponse COVID-19 pandemic collective type measure welcome urgent even though can only constitute one component much broader solidarity effort has some important virtues particular scale planned but we identify questions caveats that it raises Systems prevent lay-offs limited time cannot be solution combat Establishing step forward organisation does dispense us making progress towards fully-fledged should act lynchpin recap main economic political arguments favour implementation such stress notwithstanding sensitivities citizens regardless whether they live North or South “old” “new” Member States cross-border timeline short It quickly possible Failing eco- nomic social upheavals vital fight grow INTRODUCTION current health crisis biggest post-war period All Union (EU) facing challenge although have been affected same way As was case ten years ago with being put test played part adopting series measures since outbreak – including suspension stability pact States’ responses new tools limit duration economy companies workers Yet failure Council meeting 26 March instead providing ambitious response confirmed divides fuelled fears existential Against warned “the climate heads state government lack pose mortal danger Union” 1 agreement obtained joint coronavirus includes plan around €500 billion allows hope rise instrument view protecting jobs named “SURE” (temporary Support mitigate Unemployment Risks Emergency) grant financial assistance form loans granted favourable terms from when latter sudden increases their public expenditure preserve employment With firepower €100 total “second line defence supporting similar help protect thus employees self-employed risk loss income” 2 presented temporary emergency “European system” had propose end year advocated many experts essential complete architecture Economic Monetary (EMU) In fact nearly existing monetary unions true ‘insurance unions’: centralise management regard banks degree Historically exception aftermath started arguing EMU needs both Banking automatic fiscal stabilisers One options establishing suggested benefit level 3 Faced governments formulated second option: supports investment capacity hit cope reduced revenue increased spending benefits 4 share common insight wit play role times whilst simultaneously While no made regarding these proposals seems third variant generic namely union must confronted severe shocks However applies 1. Le manque de solidarité « mortel » pour l’Europe AFP 28 mars 2. Proposal Regulation establishment risks (SURE) following 3. Reflection deepening 31 May 2017 4. “New budgetary instruments stable within framework” Communication EP ECB December whole logic behind indeed applicable entire Single Market first return debate (part 1) then position 2) order avoid any misunderstan- ding our argument let alone EU’s crisis: massive intervention needed But risk-sharing domain parcel more encompassing relief Hence question what extent fits bill term how relates further unemploy- ment EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT RE-INSURANCE: RATIONAL ARGUMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION purchasing power downturn therefore stabiliser par excellence surprising key elements Existing either opt downright centralisation historically Canada Germany demand convergence provide need particularly high US combines decentralisation notably deep recession hits related legitimacy relevant endow (1 ) 5 addition while divided might popular hesitant Euro- pean leaders thought 1.1 From point rational policy option reason Two major stand out i) Without implemented ex ante functioning inher- ently fragile inherently fragility mainly due currently functions escalating trust so-called ‘sudden stops’ markets rely issue debt analysis developed Paul Grauwe lessons especially situation 5. ANDOR L 2016 “Towards shared area” IZA Journal Labor Studies vol n° 10 F “Automatic stabilizers model” Other document 22 September RAGOT X 2019 Civiliser le Capitalisme Crise du libéralisme européen et retour politique Paris: Fayard 6. DE GRAUWE P 2018 Economics Integration 12th edition Cambridge: Cambridge Press p 140 advantage pooling face asymmetric often (to interregional smoo- thing limits scale) effective organises smoothing able organise intertemporal Interregional combined 7 Moreover crucial set up (rather negotiated post hit) way: mere existence change expectations agents fall-out shock occurs nutshell leaving aside technicalities commitment means assured receive fund increase ii) matter concern stabilisation based incomplete there useful economically highly integrated trade production integration goes beyond compared well-known about ‘positive externalities’ vaccination National systems create positive externality: country properly insures itself helps neighbours stabi- lising consumer imports (similarly individuals who vaccinate themselves infectious diseases externality them too) Because just interest widespread practice effectiveness depends cluster principles: sufficiently generous benefits; sufficient coverage rates schemes; labour market segmentation leaves force poorly insured unemployment; proliferation relations into insurance; activation unemployed individuals; constitution buffers good so do bad Whether principles each State programme “vaccination instability” general contribute appropriate (think subsidisation authorities8) Conversely domestic could well become fortiori imperative equipped agree other’s if exchange guarantee function adequately 7. Regarding see DOLLS M An Re-Insurance Scheme Eurozone? Stabilizing Redistributive Effects EconPol Policy Report ifo Munich 8. theorem theory: insufficient sub-optimal provision promoted supported another 1.2 What think? Our previous section implies quality policies sharing intrinsically whereby former conditions premise development field gather Indeed broadly democratic reckoning initiatives survey experiment conducted focused aim 19 500 people thirteen were polled assess respondents judge different specific designs These varied minimum generosity education training programmes provided results show fundamental opposition confined small segment popula- tion contrary think listening over last strong North-South divisions reflected opinion Notwithstanding priorities surprisingly determined overall Box Avoid unnecessary Preserve companies’ human capital Limit severity Maintain households’ income Loans To cover costs creation extension other Up BILLION backed €25 guarantees voluntarily committed budget leverage 9. For in-depth discussion normative here Solidarity through Redistribution Insurance Incomes: Guide Guarantor Provider? Centre Paper No 2020/013 February 10. NICOLI insurance: really think” 13 BURGOON B KUHN T SACCHI S VAN DER DUIN D HEGEWALD “Risk Sharing When Hits: How Design Influences Citizen Risk (EURS)” AISSR PROTECTING EMPLOYMENT IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT CRISIS WHILE MAINTAINING MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK meets need: textbook use (2 Both volume appear few raised approach inevitably remedied creating genuine 3) 2.1 Short-time subsidy reductions number hours worked firms employers experience drops reduce employees’ laying off Employees proportional reduction (for overview table appendix) Lay-offs future hiring capa- cities networks maintained households Thus significantly mitigated Giupponi Landais11 convincingly work: context forms universal transfers efficient wage subsidies action very reasons mentioned apply (the without sta- bilisers; externalities adequate cf metaphor) gains Admittedly normal business cycle movements relatively disruption destroys matches supply chains large-scale economies external impact huge ‘vaccinating’ 2.2 characteristics responsibility aforementioned focus well-taken rather distinc- job meaningful labelled Nevertheless likely lower actual better ini- tiative promises significant (€100 billion) tackle There 11. GIUPPONI G LANDAIS C Building SURE’s firepower: three representing largest exceed €60 provides indication figure Over reached record €193 2010 EU-27 stood €174 If consider Spain Italy equal €58 fell €49 12 clear envisaged may costly (both because arrangements greater conventional measures’ scope application broad groups usually self-employed) data figures amount promised lockdown continue months additional funding probably necessary asset article 122 TFEU funded intergovernmental By using Stability Mechanism (ESM) avoids interference (divisive) ESM vehicle corona borrow directly markets; underlying close Financial Stabilisation (EFSM) almost double versus Another interesting feature introduces (cf supra combine smoothing) decision-making process adoption regulation creates requires qualified majority voting available take voluntary basis (no legal obligation under law) instrument’s (article regulation) Una- nimity required make financially operational “make available” according contributions “irrevocable unconditional guarantees” 11) account 25% (therefore allocated decided relative gross Although participation gua- rantee desirable credit rating perspective (in rates) veto ruled however clearly breach founded construction shoulder responsibilities ensure enjoys instrument; once place decision granting loan applicant 6) adopted upon 12. EUROSTAT ESSPROS viewed 2.3 SURE: short-term medium-term perspectives Having identified range core features having underscored now proposal; overcome First proposes grants soft preferable support: addresses immediate ensures low increasing rate own bond issues sharply levels little looming unsustainability those Second Landais list concrete guidelines best short- context: payments timely conditional retain eligibility extended replacement established non- sectors working hour flexible programme’s confinement highlight difficulty urgency deal hand legacies heterogeneous lose: hence understandable try impose detailed rightly measures: crisis” 14 learn practices guidance already said Discussing imposing imply delays afford longer mutual delineation conditionality maximally politically sustainable Third certain underscore Inevitably laid off: insu- rance laid-off ineligible bound given contracts sectors: renewed dismissed facto jure note lacunae precarious establish access whatever sector activity earn living Pillar Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed (non-binding) Recommendation protection 2019; badly Implementing prominently roadmap 15 13. GUIPPOINI (op cit add incentivised 14. Questions answers 15. 8 November Fourth operated requests disbursement depend bilateral agreements discretionary effectively expec- tations entail automaticity 16 sense seen complement ‘normal’ adds ‘job insurance’ created exogenous disaster So conceived day ‘plug-in’ ready installed immediately exceptional emergencies CONCLUSION: TIME TO LOSE merely maximum i e helping self- employed give businesses soon reticent aware hesitations damage repaired At 16. Even publications effects decision-making); BALLEER GEHRKE LECHTHALER W MERKL Ch ‘Does save jobs? analysis’ Review Vol 84 pp 99-122 ; HOCHMUTH “Counteracting Crises: Non-Linear Short-Time Work Policy” Scandinavian 22/8/2019 APPENDIX Table Comparison SUPPORT GRANTED BY NATIONAL SHORT-TIME WORK SCHEMES MEASURES SELF-EMPLOYED Austria Compensation representing: *90% salaries EUR 700 *85% 685 *80% 370 *100% apprentices *Eligibility pro- gramme Belgium *70% salary supplemented lump-sum 63 per *Replacement 291 69 month (EUR 614 dependants) *Deferrals security repayments * Extension deadlines withholding taxes Bulgaria co-financed company n/a Czech Republic *60% quarantine stoppage operations *Between 60% 100% employ- ees experiencing problems sale volumes *Daily allowance CZK 424 (≈ 16) most days *Postponement insur- ance one-off 25 000 tax-free 930) Denmark *For salaried employees: compensation monthly 75% DKK 23 000) non-salaried 90% 500) *Self-employed freelance expe- riencing turnover 30% lost in- come 100 Estonia covered 150 paid *Exoneration advance tax payable quarter Finland Temporary entrepreneurs waiting period) France roughly 84% net minimum-wage *Lump-sum via corresponding turn- micro-entrepreneurs liberal professionals suffering drop subject adminis- trative closure difference accor- dance agreements) *Fixed Greece *Compensation 50% calculat- ed average two *EUR 800 *Social pension Hungary 70% compa- nies recording Ireland (tax-free) 410 week un- 350 *Ordinary Wage Guarantee Fund (CIGO): covers 80% *Extraordinary (CIGS): cov- ers *Solidarity contracts: wages work- ing CIGO CIGS ceiling Protection (INPS) 600 *An municipalities Covid-19 Latvia pay- ments Lithuania *Partial employee’s exceeding below 257 Luxem- bourg can- 250% *6-month moratorium taken Neth- erlands *22 5% *45% *Access *Monthly 050 (at married couples children) Poland *State 455) Portugal 66% 905 *Flexible *Possibility defer Romania sala- ry Slovakia *Allowance 540 Slovenia *40% cases majeure event guaranteed contribution mini- mum 220% *3-month mortgage *Suspension *Option postponing payment worked) penalty lines Sweden *Granting standardised sick pay Source: compiled OECD address
Unemployment benefits and activation in federal welfare states: An institutional moral hazard perspective
Regional & Federal Studies ISSN: 1359-7566 (Print) 1743-9434 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www tandfonline com/loi/frfs20 Unemployment benefits and activation in federal welfare states: An institutional moral hazard perspective Christiaan Luigjes Frank Vandenbroucke To cite this article: (2020): DOI: 10 1080/13597566 2020 1751127 link to https://doi org/10 Published online: 15 Apr Submit your article journal View related articles Crossmark data Full Terms Conditions of access use can be found at com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=frfs20 REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES benefits AISSR University Amsterdam Netherlands KEYWORDS Institutional hazard; multi-tiered states; intergovernmental relations; federalism; unemployment insurance; social assistance; active labour market policies Introduction Since the 1990s subnational1 governments have become more involved ‘regulation unemployment’ i e design implementation financing unemployment-related This trend is reorientation towards ‘active’ states specifically adoption Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) (Finn 2000; Sabatinelli 2010) There a growing literature on relations policy (Kazepov 2010; Obinger Leibfried Castles 2005; Van Berkel De Graaf Sirovátka 2011a) Intergovernmental tensions over burden- sharing regulation (Bonoli Trein 2016; Bonoli Natili 2019) coordination challenges (Øverbye et al are well-documented We analyze how decentralization weaken incentives for subnational minimize risk unemploy- ment either through lax federally financed CONTACT chrisluigjes@protonmail com Nieuwe Achtergracht 166 1018WV © Informa UK Limited trading as Taylor Francis Group benefit schemes or shifting caseloads from Such ‘institutional hazard’ goes beyond conflicts about ‘which government pays what’; it profound effects solidarity functioning In Section one we hypothesize that (IMH) affects hypothesis confirmed three case studies: Switzerland Belgium United States (US) (Section three) IMH these federations but its form remedies applied differ four develops general propositions factors influencing perception problem actual remedies: generosity insurance constitutional context autonomy interregional differences Also distinguish two types by control unemployment: those concern interpretation ‘insurance contracts’ fundamental regarding legiti- macy conclude formulating research agenda conceptualized federal-subnational against costs associated with unem- ployment If responsibilities regu- lation such negatively affect reduce ‘institutional’ emerges Our (A) (B) consequential division especially However issue has not been sys- tematically theorized Beyond deductively testing presence our primary aim inductive theory-building: develop explain variation intergo- vernmental respond by-product While past focused substance body addresses governance aspects including multilevel Leib- fried The sub- stance each other (Van Borghi 2007); substantive away passive income-replacement went hand-in-hand tendency decentralize Decentralizing thought increase their efficiency vis- à-vis central one-size-fits-all approach (López-Santana 2015 11) fits within broader introducing New Public Management (NPM) (Weishaupt NPM tools – perform- ance management help policy-makers coordinate between standar- dized logic administration individualized flexible delivering services (Karjalainen also result clashes interests Fiscal federalism shows sometimes engage opportunistic behaviour an attempt shift another level premised assumption ceteris paribus motivated desire relax own budget constraints (Weingast 2009 283) NPM- used steer changing Importantly zero-sum game; downward trans- fer counterintuitively stronger albeit indirect (Minas Wright 2012) Because inherent ambiguity processes will define con- ditions under which occur But before do must itself Moral ability insured party influence probability loss cost lower than expected gain (Barr 2012 92–93) frame analysis terms ‘moral because characterized risks Rather seeing mostly influenced macroeconomic paradigm emphasizes individ- ual’s responsibility find work (Dean 2007) From ALMPs mitigate individual-level pro- vided When responsible national bear fiscal conse- quences if (partly) financial situated focus forms 2 First ‘ineffective activation’ whereby meet expectations reduction second ‘dumping’ beneficiaries subnationally For necessary tasked particular 3 distinguishes adminis- trative political 14–16) Incen- tives ineffective arise when finances individual scheme while govern- ments activating instance ‘park’ grams little them get back Incentives dumping subna- tional fund encourage applicants apply instead Dumping way balance objectives ‘owning’ enhances legitimacy avoiding budgetary discusses ways try ensure compliance goals (Braun 2014 806; 2008 396) Inspired identify IMH: minimum requirements Insurance implies existence contract regulates pay-outs conditions Financial and/or structure make finance part sensitive outcomes might stop provide lump-sum block grants governments; decouples number Minimum codify responsibil- ities performance example oblige gov- ernment certain achieve targets degree ‘contract’ codified determines Admittedly metaphor limitations: entities pay specific identifiable premium’ return coverage cases test analyzing where relevant devolved governments: US developing affecting salience think decentralized unitary countries expect dynamic most pronounced reasons likely significant Second contrast competencies often constitutionally guaranteed cannot recentralize discretionary manner Øverbye (UI) American UI shared state all assistance (SA) therefore present short ‘most cases’ regard heterogeneity constituent units methods burden-sharing 4 These could possibility remedy extent challenge proposed represent North-American country non-EU European EU Member State By applying case-design whether holds different contexts maximize range policy-experiences draw lessons claims theory-building (Rohlfing 84–90) section attempts centralizing cantonal SA were relatively unsuccessful limited cantons able ‘dump’ programs discuss concerns perverse interactions designed (or ‘insured’) Activation administrative historically municipal Hence no incentive activate benefici- aries effectively 1995 following crisis started emphasize transferred municipalities had create new offices assumed intention was centralize man- agement standards enrollments seen too rigid subopti- mal (Duell 2010 51) Other proposals strengthen imposition output-based (Ehrler Sager 2011 162) Instead introduced relaxed measurement backed up (cantonal) peer-review system (Bertozzi Ross 146) Originally paired bonus/malus several questioned validity indicators underpinning element quietly dropped 15) very success- ful Currently legislation prescribes require- policy-behaviour broad stark strat- egies persist 146–148; Duell 49) lacks bite relies publishing reviews Unlike every respect Cantonal still diverse cerned fragmented nature necessarily same being concerned generated fragmentation led serve both Therefore prioritize caseload Furthermore grew Champion 9–11) since job cre- ation requalify actively assisted filing disability insur- even paid legal fees appeal dismissal 10) Between 1990 2003 nearly doubled size (Champion 124) interpreted Cantons perceived correct application law prompted centralization mid-2000s 14–15) met resistance Centralization ultimately proved limiting high; eventually stopped rising diminished urgency 16) opted collaboration themselves produced non-binding inter- guidelines did something harmonize limit per- verse utilized using activation-funds decided co-finance provided ben- eficiaries contributions capped 53–55) changed eligibility cri- teria 2004 largely preventing transfers 2016 609) Third tightened criteria support starting affected Swiss worried policy- makers address Despite strong successful protect- ing Moreover potential canto- nal however suc- cessful closing off conflict strengthening major changes occurred acti- vation recent reform relative lack respon- sibilities regional 1980s; yet charge monitoring job-search sanction- regions wanted ‘positive’ disconnected sanctions 1999 Verhofstadt launched ‘active state’ became salient disparities employment strategies they adopted ernments deeply Flemish nationalism increasingly fers Wallonia (Béland Lecours 2005 273) Brussels ‘a culture dependency’ 273); nationalists only ended splitting secur- ity Walloon argued comparatively high rates due exogenous circumstances deindus- trialization migration II negotiated federal-regional cooperation agreement based detailed resulted consistent effort intensified convergence organization (Vandenbroucke 60) agree- explicitly addressed via strict It established close-monitoring gradual sanctioning individuals Although considered ‘second-best solution’ 2007): ideally instruments punitive ones concentrated into effect decentra- lized activation: normative framework included transfer until then partly include again; accompanied gained compe- tencies treatment unemployed people remained prolonged indefinitely play marginal role co-insured least 50–65 percent rest organized funded left considerable Traditionally clients’ well- 2002 shifted discourse (De Bie Vandenbussche 2016) Nevertheless vague untouched Municipalities (Bogaerts Hermans 2005) Notwithstanding munici- pal co-financing there structural federal-municipal mission information concerning With took former regulating unchanged implement retain partial Even though may better equipped integrate overall (compared government) so Addition- ally common practice persons allowed times promoted regarded contrary polarized public debate far combination inter-municipal (via funding) entrenched fabric whilst inter-regional soli- darity controversial many years Belgian demonstrates importance versus reluctant restrict autonomy; first impact next 1996 Political federal-state imposes important parameters (e g generosity) set payroll tax employers trust funds taxes keep low possible pressure depleted steps prevent relying backstop loan repaid continues borrow year ‘penalty rates’ putting refill So principle mitigates penalty meant maintain ade- quate solvency penalties borrowing adapted 1983 Subsequently vast majority (non-binding) (GAO 10–12); during Great Recession 36 Additionally levels rise extraordinarily fast extends During previous extended maximum duration 26 99 weeks 5 Thus regain some increased restricted reduced state-level does Obama defined condition circumvented ending after free Again aimed efforts (Klerman 2013) economic stabilization function reliance funding dollars flowing legitimated stricter subsided consensus quickly dissipated residual targeted Before main program (Aid Families Dependent Children AFDC) implemented regulatory families children notably single mothers Benefits co- 50 almost 85 depending actors AFDC-case- loads At time agitation resonated (Haskins 2006 35) case- constraining AFDC transformed grant: Temporary Assist- Needy (TANF) legislated mandatory time-limits TANF dur- longer ‘the promise greater outlays dollars’ (Hoke 1998 120) politi- cal greatly expanded Initially shrunk enormously reductions levelled 2000 easily loop- holes (Germanis newfound enabled redirect grant supplant- existing expenditures 32) operated prerogative 2001 Bush substantially move overreach waged watered-down version initial proposal finally passed (Allard lot ‘slush fund’ 40 53) government’s State-run interact SA-adjacent AFDC/TANF Sup- plemental Security Income (SSI) early SSI exploded (Berkowitz DeWitt 2013 181–183) Caseload contributing factor (Kubik 2003) measures (Rogowski 2002) making difficult Over gains beneficiary evidence suggests continued (Wamhoff Wiseman 2006) interacts food stamps (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program SNAP) completely regulated (Moffitt 2015) A study finds portion savings cash replaced SNAP (Parolin Some issues noted reports appetite rather resolve involves sophisticated AFDC- transformation combines switch co-insur- seems unable there- fore closely guarded Discussion confirmed: reforms guise remedied differed summarize similarities formulate Similarities generous (Table 1); here domi- nant worries normal Table 1 Overview periods discussed Gross replacement Maximum Expenditure % Country Time period ratea GDPb (1995) Reform (1999– 30% 29–37% 104 0 9% 4–1 0% 2008) Cooperation (2003–2004) Sixth (2009–2011) Extended emergency (2008–2014) 42% Unlimited* 8% 37–38% 3–3 1% 23%** 4% Benefit average wagec GDPd Debate (2004–2008) Constitutional 21–28 6%** Unlimited 2–0 21–22 2%** 3–0 26.8 %** 5% AFDC-TANF (1995–1996) Not available No 3% reauthorization (2005) limit: 60 months aOECD tax-benefit database: (summary measure entitlements) gross earnings family situations durations 2007 bSOCX (10-7-1-1-1) 1990–2013 cOECD amounts head household + spouse percen- tage wage US: child aged 3–12 percentage Michigan dSOCX income maintenance (10-9-1-1-1/2/3/4 includes spending USA 1995: 10-5-1-1-1 10-7-1-1-2 1997-2012: 10-5-1-1-2 10-7-1-1-3 19 = missing) 1990–2012 *Contingent renewal authorities **Nearest 6 interesting fiercely politicized possibly received attention explained difference Another explanation structurally unequal Belgium: concomitant redistribution resisted Especially long prerogative: unconstitutional thwarted name state-led lations 7 subsequent modest drawn-out struggle And agreements unilateral dictates blematized varies Interactions prominent subject disputes closed pathways Similar gone uncontested unusual feature fact instrument protection: generally accepted cover- age proper universal Factors not) sensitivity 1) 8 increases effective higher 2) demonstrate ‘Owning’ why triggers governmental balanced tread lightly Partly Generosity Ungenerous Generous Low salience: Moderate High reflects realities constrained hard overcome chal- lenges vis-à-vis contentious matter shy illustrated Overall contention auton- omy less rely experience employ- contribute permanent redistributive transfers; undermines notion insurance-based chimes Trein’s expectation heterogeneous collective identities clear distinctions net-payers net-receivers (Trein 2019 6–7) differ- ences convey idea causal regardless accurate heightened turn push confront posit differs SA-related inclined pol- itical identified above benefits; having complex needs allow dealing 288; 2011b 241) local historical pedigree initiatives partially seem prefer limits allows contract’ Disentangling manifestation true inevitably liable fuels poor record emphasized emerge monitor Specifically argue (proposed) valid gage Whether constitute ‘interpretation’ acting spirit letter type arises imposed tract’ ‘overreach’ saw dictate debates put what viola- tion Conclusion increasing emphasis ten- dency resulting conceptualize contracts; tension unconcerned empha- sized explaining cases: Further- challenges: question tract; fundamentally reject authority regulate Further needed capacity Central faced probably findings ‘risk- sharing’ Monetary Union creation Eurozone re-insurance (European Commission 2017 25–26) dominated domestic would pooled across EMU [reference deleted review] benchmarking formance integration traditional core powers EU-level (Genschel Jachtenfuchs 2018) mix examined paper required feasible establish Euro- zone miti- gated degree: render impossible areas responsi- bilities long-term care elderly (Vabo (and how) domain 9 Notes 1. purposes ‘subnational’ refers elements 2. weak education icies involve bureaucratic developed direct politically 3. (López- Santana Once absolute branches institutions (intra- decentralization) non-governmental parties (delegation) principal-agent theories appropriate 4. See online appendix B comparison 5. refer Emergency Compensation 6. conditionality uncon- troversial crises 6) 7. clear-cut dichotomy choosing mutually exclusive 8. qualitative assessments 9. healthcare ‘risks’ materializing mainly curative; need take Disclosure Statement interest reported author(s) Funding supported Commission: [grant VC/2015/0006] References Allard S “The Changing Face Welfare Administration ” Publius: Federalism 37 (3): 304–332 Barr N Economics 5th ed York: Oxford Press Béland D “Nationalism Policy Development: Social 25 (2): 265–285 Berkowitz E L Welfare: Supplemental U Ithaca: Cornell Bertozzi F G Road Activation: Legal Aspects Implementation Outcomes Bringing Jobless Into Work? Experiences Schemes Europe edited W Eichhorst O Kaufman R Konle-Seidl 121–159 Berlin: Springer Verlag Bogaerts K I Marx Vandelannoote Mechelen Activering bij Werkloosheid en Recht op Maatschappelijke Integratie (Research Commissioned FOD Werkgelegenheid Arbeid Sociaal Overleg (BE)) Antwerp: Antwerp C “Federalism Work Switzerland: Development Fragmented 45 (1): 77–98 M P “A Federalist’s Dilemma: Trade-Offs Legitimacy Budget Responsibility Multi-Tiered 29 56–69 “Cost-shifting Multitiered States: Responding Rising Caseloads Germany 46 (4): 596–622 Braun “Federal Dynamics Times Economic Crisis Research 53 803–821 “Switzerland: Latecomer Catching Regulating Risk Unemployment: National Adaptations Post-Industrial Labour Markets J Clasen Clegg 121–141 Oxford: Dean H Ethics Welfare-to-Work Politics 34 573–589 “40 Jaar OCMW-Praktijk de Spanning Tussen Bijstand als Beleidsinstrument Grondrecht OCMW Wilde Cantillon 49–64 Leuven: ACCO Tergeist Bazant Cimper Paris: OECD Ehrler “Marketization System: Modes Governance Activate T 153–172 Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Reflection Paper Deepening (COM(2017) 291) Finn “Welfare Work: Local Dimension 43–57 GAO Trust Funds: Long-Standing Financing Have Increased Insolvency (GAO-10-440) Washington DC: Government Accountability Office – Improved Oversight Eligibility Expansions Needed (GAO-12-670) Genschel 2018 “From Integration Core Powers: Refugee Theory Common 56 178–196 Germanis “TANF Broken! It’s Reform” Fix Problems Treat Symptoms” https://mlwiseman com/wp-content/uploads/ 2013/09/TANF-is-Broken 072515 pdf Failure Requirements 2015: Need “a much way” com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/The- Failure-of-TANF-Work-Requirements Haskins Inside Story Brookings Institution “De actieve welvaartsstaat werking een sociologische studie naar implementatie van het activeringsbeleid werkvloer vlaamse OCMW’s (PhD) Hoke “State Discretion Under Legislation: Illusion Reality Federalism-Based Challenge Stanford Law Review 9: 115–130 Karjalainen V “Actors Scaling Rescaling Policies: Towards Multilevel Y Kazepov 139– 174 Farnham: Ashgate Klerman “Unemployment Early 21st Century https://
Bestrijding van de werkloosheid: de bijdrage van Post-Keynesiaanse Economen
“” 1 u h 1111 1_ v 01 clo S tu d ie k rin g W van Rijckeghem (red ) l’ o 11 H c y 111d i Ecc:u101nie 1111r/ ‘ 1t r /11 1’/ t () V II I/ 111 cl Il Ooay Fortma n 1110 ( 13 Goud zw aa rd piot A M de Roos p f Macro-econon1ie en politiek Bi jd ra : Driehuis J Duijn F E Klijn Milt enbur Moula ert U Rosenthal Va nde nb ro cke Vermaat Samsam Uitgeverij Alphen aan den Rijn/Brussel 1983 6 Bestrijding werkloosheid: bijdrage Post-Keynesiaanse economen FRANK MOULAERT /FRA NK VANDENBROUCKE* De titel dit hoofdstuk roept een reeks vragen op die we – conventiegetrouw kunnen verdelen in twee categorieën Primo welke theoretische post-Keynesiaan se leveren tot beter begrip crisis iich nu al bijna 10 jaar ontwikkelt? En secundo norma tieve meer praktische inbreng zij formulering economisch beleid ter bestrijding werkloosheid? In overeenstemming met deze ruime omvat hoofdituk grote delen: 1) “Analyse”: hierin beschrijven summiere wijze verschillende historische inzichten relevant zijn voor huidige We pleiten daar bij vooral betere synthese tussen vaak uiteenlopende benaderingen 2) “Taken”: meest belangrijke problemen onderzoeksterreinen professionele vandaag het licht enorme Bij voorbeeld werken één voorstel uit (arbeidsduurverkor ting) “Analyse” “Taken” uiteraard sterk elkaar ver bonden; eigenlijk zouden ze samenhangend geheel moeten rmen er ons bewust dat hier nog niet val is mate waarin beide delen uiteenlopen te nt taakspanning waar economie-beoefening ‘lf Met dank Paul Zeeuwts Miltenburg Walter Kcnnes hun commentaren 16 7 voorstaat Alhoewel opzet dus ambitieus kan lijken blijft resultaat beschei den: eerder tussentijds rapport dan defi nitief verslag Maar troosten gedachte misschien wel blijvende kenmerk vak zal blijven 6.1. Analyse economische Achtergronden crisis: overzicht poging afdeling proberen strengen verschil lende naar toe te halen hoop zo steviger koord maken om alter natief hangen verklaren ontstaan crisis-situatie door interactie ener zijds structureel onevenwicht wereldeconomie anderzijds institutionele instabiliteit Het gaat daarbij ontwikkelingen reeds gang kwamen jaren zestig A. Structurele etiket “structureel” gebruiken eer der enge zin sectoriële verdeling produktie inkomen bedrijfstaksgewijze groei Primaire versus industriële sector Een eerste ruwe vaststelling aanzienlijk deel haar oorsprong vindt oneven wichti gheden sectoren materi ele primaire sec tor bedoelen bepaald drastische verschui ving ruiltermen sinds 1972-73 kern probleem als volgt schetsen Continue stabiele vereist outputs industri gepaste proportie groeien principe zou prijsmechanisme via relatieve prijs (ruil voet) evenwicht garan deren é rvaring prijsscho mmelingen loop dez e eeuw heeft aangetoond prijsme chanisme hoogst onefficiënte regulator Eén aanleidingen depressie dertig was daling aantal pri maire produkten tengevolge kleinere vraag van- wereld overproduktie daarmee samenhangende inkomensverlies producenten leidde beurt uitvoerprodukten enzovoort ont wikkeling 1972-1973 net omgekeerd prijzen energie scherp stegen zoals derti eveneens reële deflatie wereldvlak Want zetten gestegen inkomens voldoende bestedingen N Kaldor (1976) wijt gezicht paradoxale ervaringen vóór oorlogse aan: uiteenlopend karakter prijsvormin (vraa aanbod speculatie sector; “administered prices” indus triële sector) asymmetrie reacties inkomensdaling res pectievelijk -stij ging inkomensstijging leidt toename bestedin gen gelijk dalin andere Ook juist hele ge heel beschouwen: verschillen treden deelsectoren gaan Belangrijk verandering 19 72-73 herschikkign betalingstekorten -overschotten deflatoire gevolgen hier worden verder behandeld dynamiek leidende bedrijfstakken concept “structureel onevenwicht” ook toe passing gedesaggregeerd niveau geleidelijke “uitputting” be drijfstakken (l eading sectors motor-sectoren) proces begon Tabel il lustreert beknopt Drie elementen komen voren: men duidelijk karakteristieke bedrijfs takken onderscheiden na-oorlogse periode merkelijk hoger groeiritme hadden gemiddelde (kolom duurzame con sumptiegoederen chemische speelden rol; 8 169 meeste landen trad 1963-1973 vertraging groeiritmes vergelijking explosieve Verder onderzoek toelaten subperiodes “levensc yclus” sleutelsectoren duiden toenemende verzadi (Van 1979); verschil tweede veel minder uitgesproken <"') "' r--- -CC-\0\C C""') i:: \C O'\CO r---1 1"'1 (lJ O'\ si