A European Social Union. Unduly idealistic or inevitable?

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FESSUD_conference_Vandenbroucke_28.9.2016

A European Social Union.
Unduly idealistic or inevitable?
Frank Vandenbroucke
University of Amsterdam
FESSUD Conference
28 September 2016
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic
progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the
gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries
(through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
• A tragic dilemma of integration?
• Design flaws in the European project?
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic
progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the
gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries
(through upward convergence across the Union)
• Initial division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
• A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)?
• Design flaws in the European project?
Minimum wages and what governments can do: net disposable
income of couple with 2 children, one minimum-wage earner
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG
Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income
Bron: CSB/MIPI
Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity At-risk-of-poverty rate (< 60) Work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity At-risk-of-poverty rate (< 60) Work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 Erosion of welfare states? Changing composition of households? More precarious jobs? Migration? Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 The social dimension of the European project according to the founding fathers: a belief in convergence • European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward convergence across the Union) • Division of labour: – economic development: supranational – coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational – social development: national sovereignty (in theory) • The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008. • A tragic dilemma of integration (in the enlarged and heterogeneous EU)? • Design flaws in the European project? Macro-economic stabilisation: smoothing of economic shocks: US vs. EMU -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010 Saving Net taxes and transfers Factor income and capital depreciation Total smoothed US: - Federal tax-and-benefit system - State-based unemployment insurance with federal framework & extensions Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper EMU: stability, sovereignty and solidarity • Why are stabilization instruments centralized in monetary unions? – Risk sharing (pooling) – Externalities (vaccination) • Paradox: in the US, solidarity systems at the state level are weak, but they are supported by solidarity mechanisms at the federal level; the EU is not ready to support strong mechanisms of solidarity at the member state level by solidarity at the EU level. • Puzzle of: – Binding agreements  sovereignty – Distrust  solidarity – Legitimate concern about moral hazard, which has become an obsession Defining the EMU’s social objective is a necessity rather than a luxury • EMU forces upon the member states : – a shared conception of labour market flexibility – symmetric guidelines on wage cost competitiveness & institutions that can deliver – long term: sustainability of pensions • Any ‘Eurozone re-insurance’ of ‘national stabilization policies presupposes (a) minimum requirements w.r.t. the adequacy of national unemployment insurance and the concomitant labour market regulation; and (b) general trust in the quality of each other’s social fabric. • The need for conceptual clarity: a European Social Union ≠ a European Welfare State A European Social Union A Social Union would • support national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their key functions (e.g. stabilization, fair corporate taxation, minimum wages) • guide the substantive development of national welfare states – via general social standards and objectives, leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States – on the basis of an operational definition of ‘the European social model’. ⇒ European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit social purpose, pursuing both national and pan-European social cohesion A European Pillar of Social Rights: arguments & caveats • A basic consensus about the general features of the ‘social order’ that is associated with the Monetary Union is a necessity; the EPSR can contribute to such a consensus. • Upward convergence across the EMU/EU28 requires a combination of social investment, sufficiently egalitarian background conditions and social protection, as embodied in the EPSR. • Caveat: perception of ‘replay’ of earlier soft initiatives will backlash Thank you 1) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7, European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf) 2) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/) 3) Vandenbroucke, Automatic Stabilisers for the Euro area and the European Social Model, Notre Europe Jacques Delors Insitute, Tribune, September 2016 (www.delorsinstitute.eu) 4) Furceri, D. en A. Zdziencicka, The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism ?, IMF Working Paper 13/198, 2013 5) Beblavy, M., G. Marconi en I. Maselli, A European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The rationale and the challenges ahead, CEPS Special Report No. 119, 2015 6) Vandenbroucke, Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven, Inaugural Lecture at the University of Amsterdam, 1 June 2016 www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl 7) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot UK, 2015, pp. 489-520. www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl