Auteur archieven: Frank Vandenbroucke

The impact of the EU on social policy

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KULeuven_Summer_School_EU_social_policy_6.6.2016

The impact of the EU on social
policy
Frank Vandenbroucke
KU Leuven Summer School
6 June 2016
Structure
• The diversity of EU welfare states
• The founding fathers’ inspiration
• Growing inequalities within and between EU Member States
• Erosion of welfare states? A tragic dilemma?
• Design flaws in EMU
• A European Social Union
The diversity of EU welfare states
Input: expenditure on social protection, gross, in % of GDP (2010)
00
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
RO LV BG EE SK PL LT MT CZ CY LU HU SI ES PT UK GR IE IT BE AT SE FI GE NL DK FR
old age & survivors Sickness/Health Care Unemployment
Disability Family/children Housing & Social Inclusion n.e.c.
Other & adm. costs
The diversity of EU welfare states
Outcome: a two-dimensional map of outcomes
The diversity of EU welfare states: poverty
Poverty risk and poverty threshold: “national” conception (SILC 2010)
,0
2000,0
4000,0
6000,0
8000,0
10000,0
12000,0
14000,0
16000,0
18000,0
,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
CZ NL SK AT HU SI SE FI DK FR LU BE MT CY GE EE IE UK PL PT IT GR LT BG ES RO LV
AROP total population, SILC 2010 Poverty threshold PPP
The performance of European welfare states
EU28
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
CR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI SK FI
SE
UK
8,0
10,0
12,0
14,0
16,0
18,0
20,0
22,0
24,0
26,0
50,0 55,0 60,0 65,0 70,0 75,0 80,0
At-risk-of-poverty rate total population, SILC
2012 (IE=SILC 2011)
Low poverty
High employment
High poverty
High employment
Low poverty
Low employment
High poverty
Low employment
Employment rate 15-64, LFS 2012
Structure
• The diversity of EU welfare states
• The founding fathers’ inspiration
• Growing inequalities within and between EU Member States
• Erosion of welfare states? A tragic dilemma?
• Design flaws in EMU
• A European Social Union
The social dimension of the European project according to the
founding fathers: a belief in convergence
• European integration would support the simultaneous pursuit of economic
progress and of social cohesion, both within countries (through the gradual
development of the welfare states) and between countries (through upward
convergence across the Union)
• Division of labour:
– economic development: supranational
– coordination of social security rights & anti-discrimination: supranational
– social development: national sovereignty (in theory)
• “European solidarity” ≈
– fair access to the dynamics of upward economic convergence (market integration + limited
solidarity transfers, in the context of the ‘cohesion policy’)
– economic freedoms, but also social rights for mobile citizens => a pan-European ‘social space’
– solidarity within Member States, to redistribute the produce of economic growth
• The convergence machine worked… more or less… until 2004/2008.
‘Semi-sovereign welfare states’ in the EU (Leibfried)
• De jure: a legislative impact that is far from trivial
– Technical coordination of social security rights
– Specific legislative initiatives (e.g. health and safety)
– Anti-discrimination procedures
– Market compatibility requirements
• De facto: pressures generated by…
– Increased competition in the internal market
– Budgetary surveillance (SGP)
– European Semester
• ‘Open coordination’ (employment & social policy)
Structure
• The diversity of EU welfare states
• The founding fathers’ inspiration
• Growing inequalities within and between EU Member States
• Erosion of welfare states? A tragic dilemma?
• Design flaws in EMU
The end of the ‘convergence machine’
Changes in poverty rates and changes in median income
BE
BG CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL PT
RO
SI SK
FI
SE
UK
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
3
-40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30%
Percentage point change in AROP
Real change in median income, in %
Relative income poverty in the population 65+
,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
Armoede (65+) 2007 Armoede (65+) 2012
Bron: Eurostat website, SILC 2008 en SILC 2013
Relative income poverty in the population 65+ (anchored)
,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
Armoede (65+) 2007 Armoede (65+) 2012, armoedegrens 2007 Armoede (65+) 2012
Long term trend
Pensions as buffer
Relative income poverty in the population < 18 ,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 At-risk-of-poverty rate Poverty (<18) 2007 Poverty (<18) 2012 Relative income poverty in the population < 18 (anchored) ,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 At-risk-of-poverty rate Poverty (<18) 2007 Poverty (<18) 2012, threshold 2007 Poverty (<18) 2012 Relative income poverty in the population < 18 (anchored) ,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 At-risk-of-poverty rate Poverty (<18) 2007 Poverty (<18) 2012, threshold 2007 Poverty (<18) 2012 Increasing inequality within MS Increasing inequality across MS A risk of vicious circles Structure • The diversity of EU welfare states • The founding fathers’ inspiration • Growing inequalities within and between EU Member States • Erosion of welfare states? A tragic dilemma? • Design flaws in EMU • A European Social Union Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity At-risk-of-poverty rate (< 60) Work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 Poverty risks in the population < 60, by work intensity of the household 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Very high work intensity High work intensity Medium Low work intensity Very low work intensity At-risk-of-poverty rate (< 60) Work intensity of the household 2004-06 2012 Erosion of welfare states? Changing composition of households? More precarious jobs? Migration? Bron: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2007; SILC 2013 The contribution of transfers (not pensions) in the reduction of poverty 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2004-06 2012 Inefficient ‘pension-heavy’ welfare states Erosion of mature welfare states ? Source: Eurostat, own calculation of ‘poverty reduction by transfers (excl. pensions)’, total population, SILC 2005-2007 en SILC 2013 What governments can do: net disposable income of couple with 2 children, one minimum-wage earner 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income Bron: CSB/MIPI Structure • The diversity of EU welfare states • The founding fathers’ inspiration • Growing inequalities within and between EU Member States • Erosion of welfare states? A tragic dilemma? • Design flaws in EMU • A European Social Union The consequences of monetary unification Transfers might mitigate the symmetry/flexibility trade-off The EU’s way: more symmetry, more flexibility Flexibility determines social order EMU’s fragility  No lender of last resort (=> Draghi)
 Intensification of national
booms and busts &
divergence in competitiveness
Institutional advantage of coordinated bargaining
Competitiveness:
symmetrical
approach
necessary
=> convergence
Defining the EMU’s social objective is a necessity rather than a
luxury
• EMU forces upon the member states a shared conception of
flexibility
• A basic consensus on the functioning of the social model is
necessary for the long-term sustainability of EMU
– short term: stabilisation
– mid term: a symmetric guideline on wage cost competitiveness
& institutions that can deliver
– long term: sustainability of pensions
• Just ‘symmetry’? Legitimacy => convergence in prosperity
The human capital asymmetry: employment and formal
educational attainment
EU28
BE
BG
CZ
DE DK
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
CR
IT
CY
LV LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK
45,0
50,0
55,0
60,0
65,0
70,0
75,0
80,0
85,0
,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0
Employment rate 15-64, 2012
% of population (15-64) with lower secondary education attainment, 2012
Many low-skilled
Low employment rate
Few low-skilled
High employment rate
Few low-skilled
Low employment rate
Structure
• The diversity of EU welfare states
• The founding fathers’ inspiration
• Growing inequalities within and between EU Member States
• Erosion of welfare states? A tragic dilemma?
• Design flaws in EMU
• A European Social Union
Main argument
• A basic consensus on the European Social Model and the role
the European Union has to play (and not to play) in the
domain of social policy…
– … is not a luxury.
– … but an existential necessity.
• The need for conceptual clarification: a European Social Union
Why is a basic consensus on the social dimension a necessity?
• an inevitability of European Monetary Union;
• Freedom of movement and national social cohesion in EU28:
‘a balancing act’
– Social dumping?
– Economic freedoms  right to strike (Viking, Laval)
• Two dimensions of solidarity: domestic (national) and panEuropean
A European Social Union
A Social Union would
• support national welfare states on a systemic level in some of their
key functions
• guide the substantive development of national welfare states – via
general social standards and objectives, leaving ways and means of
social policy to Member States – on the basis of an operational
definition of ‘the European social model’.
⇒ European countries would cooperate in a union with an explicit
social purpose, pursuing both national and pan-European social
cohesion
The case for a European Social Union
• support national welfare states on a systemic level in key functions
(e.g. stabilization)
• guide the substantive development of national welfare states
– via general social standards and objectives
⇒symmetric w.r.t. to competiveness (wage policy & capacity to deliver)
⇒social investment
⇒minimum wages and minimum income protection
⇒solidarity in reform
– leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States
The case for a European Social Union
• support national welfare states on a systemic level in key functions
(e.g. stabilization)
• guide the substantive development of national welfare states
– via general social standards and objectives
⇒symmetric w.r.t. to competiveness (wage policy & capacity to deliver)
⇒social investment
⇒solidarity in reform
⇒minimum wages and minimum income protection
⇒solidarity in reform
– leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States
The case for a European Social Union
• support national welfare states on a systemic level in key functions
(e.g. stabilization)
• guide the substantive development of national welfare states
– via general social standards and objectives
⇒symmetric w.r.t. to competiveness (wage policy & capacity to deliver)
⇒social investment
⇒solidarity in reform
⇒minimum wages and minimum income protection
⇒solidarity in reform
– leaving ways and means of social policy to Member States
Thank you
1) Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and
cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways
forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/)
2) Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling through to a Sense of
Common Purpose, in Marin, B. (Ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe, Ashgate: Aldershot
UK, 2015, pp. 489-520.
3) Vandenbroucke, A European Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable?, European Debates, 7,
European Investment Bank Institute, September 2015 (http://institute.eib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/A-European-Social-Union-Unduly-Idealistic-or-Inevitable.pdf)
4) Vandenbroucke, with B. Vanhercke, A European Social Union. 10 Tough nuts to crack, Friends of
Europe, Spring 2014
http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Portals/13/Events/WorkingGroups/Social_Europe/03_03_14_Rep
ort_SocialUnion_FINAL_V.pdf

De sociale rol van de Europese Unie: tussen naïviteit en doemdenken

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Universiteitsdag_Vandenbroucke_4.6.2016

De sociale rol van de Europese Unie:
tussen naïviteit en doemdenken
Frank Vandenbroucke
Universiteitsdag UvA
4 juni 2016
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
Ohlin-rapport, 1956
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
Ohlin-rapport, 1956
Het ongelijke Europa
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen staten
(t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
US
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen lidstaten
(t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
EU27
De Europese inkomensladder: een bewegende spreidstand
Roemenië Denemarken
Top
quintiel 4 32% 133%
Top
quintiel 3 30% 140%
Top
quintiel 2 28% 145%
Top
quintiel 1 23% 152%
100% = gemiddelde van de 27 lidstaten
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma?
Wat overheden kunnen: netto-koopkracht van minimumloner
met partner en twee kinderen
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG
Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income
Bron: CSB/MIPI
Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden
(bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 NL 2004-07 NL 2010-13 Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden (bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 NL 2004-07 NL 2010-13 Uitkeringen / gemiddelde inkomens Werk aan de onderkant Gezinstypes Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten: een tragisch dilemma? • De founding fathers geloofden in… – convergentie door integratie – cohesie in de convergentie • Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000 niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten • Oorzaken? – Een tragisch dilemma? – Constructiefouten in de muntunie In welke mate worden bestedingen gestabiliseerd bij economische schokken (‘uitgevlakt’)? -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010 Saving Net taxes and transfers Factor income and capital depreciation Total smoothed VS: - Federale inkomensbelastingen & - Statelijke werkloosheidsverzekering, met federale omkadering, ondersteuning en uitbreiding Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper 13/198 EMU: stabiliteit, soevereiniteit en solidariteit • Waarom worden stabiliseringsmechanismen in muntunies centraal georganiseerd? – Spreiding van risico’s (pooling) – Externaliteiten (vaccinatie) • Paradox: VSA consolideren zwakke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten met solidariteitsmechanismen op het federale niveau; EU lukt er niet in om sterke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten te ondersteunen met solidariteit op het EU niveau • Puzzel van: – Bindende afspraken  soevereiniteit – Wantrouwen  solidariteit – Fobie voor moral hazard, die ons verhindert om ze aan te pakken EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme?  Gemiddeld inkomen EU-migranten > gemiddeld inkomen Amsterdammers
(behalve Oost-Europeanen)
 Beroep op bijstand < beroep op bijstand Amsterdammers (Oost-Europeanen: geen groot verschil)  Armoede: vergelijkbaar met Amsterdammers, behalve Oost-Europeanen EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) • Evenwicht is mogelijk: fair mobility • Non-discriminatie & detachering: samenhangende visie nodig Wat overheden kunnen: netto-koopkracht van minimumloner met partner en twee kinderen 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income Bron: CSB/MIPI Perspectieven • Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is noodzakelijk • Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten? • Wederkerigheid en grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit: – non-discriminatie  detachering – kan iedereen van twee walletjes eten? Een Europese Sociale Unie Een Europese Sociale Unie: • ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie) • oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij lidstaten ligt; • op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model. ⇒ Solidariteit, binnen lidstaten, tussen lidstaten ⇒ Wederkerigheid als basis om beleidsvermogen te heroveren www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

Een Europese Sociale Unie: illusie of noodzaak?

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AAC_ESU_illusie_noodzaak_2.6.2016

Een Europese Sociale Unie: illusie of
noodzaak?
Een pleidooi voor helder denken over de rol van de
Europese Unie
Frank Vandenbroucke
Amsterdamse Academische Club
Lustrumlezing, 2 juni 2016
Een Europese Sociale Unie
Een Europese Sociale Unie:
• ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op
systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie)
• oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene sociale
standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij lidstaten
ligt;
• op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model.
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
Ohlin-rapport, 1956
Het ongelijke Europa
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen staten
(t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
US
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen lidstaten
(t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
EU27
De Europese inkomensladder: een bewegende spreidstand
Roemenië Denemarken
Top
quintiel 4 32% 133%
Top
quintiel 3 30% 140%
Top
quintiel 2 28% 145%
Top
quintiel 1 23% 152%
100% = gemiddelde van de 27 lidstaten
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma?
Wat overheden kunnen: netto-koopkracht van minimumloner
met partner en twee kinderen
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG
Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income
Bron: CSB/MIPI
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma?
– Constructiefouten in de muntunie
In welke mate worden bestedingen gestabiliseerd bij
economische schokken (‘uitgevlakt’)?
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010
Saving
Net taxes and transfers
Factor income and capital
depreciation
Total smoothed
VS:
– Federale inkomensbelastingen &
– Statelijke werkloosheidsverzekering, met
federale omkadering, ondersteuning en uitbreiding
Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper 13/198
EMU: stabiliteit, soevereiniteit en solidariteit
• Waarom worden stabiliseringsmechanismen in muntunies centraal
georganiseerd?
– Spreiding van risico’s (pooling)
– Externaliteiten (vaccinatie)
• Paradox: VSA consolideren zwakke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten
met solidariteitsmechanismen op het federale niveau; EU lukt er niet in
om sterke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten te ondersteunen met
solidariteit op het EU niveau
• Puzzel van:
– Bindende afspraken  soevereiniteit
– Wantrouwen  solidariteit
– Fobie voor moral hazard, die ons verhindert om ze aan te pakken
EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie
• Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme?
 Gemiddeld inkomen EU-migranten > gemiddeld inkomen Amsterdammers
(behalve Oost-Europeanen)
 Beroep op bijstand < beroep op bijstand Amsterdammers (Oost-Europeanen: geen groot verschil)  Armoede: vergelijkbaar met Amsterdammers, behalve Oost-Europeanen EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) • Evenwicht is mogelijk: fair mobility • Non-discriminatie & detachering: samenhangende visie nodig Perspectieven • Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is noodzakelijk • Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten? • Wederkerigheid en grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit: – non-discriminatie  detachering – kan iedereen van twee walletjes eten? Wat overheden kunnen: netto-koopkracht van minimumloner met partner en twee kinderen 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income Bron: CSB/MIPI Perspectieven • Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is noodzakelijk • Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten? • Wederkerigheid en grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit: – non-discriminatie  detachering – kan iedereen van twee walletjes eten? Een Europese Sociale Unie Een Europese Sociale Unie: • ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie) • oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij lidstaten ligt; • op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model. ⇒ Solidariteit, binnen lidstaten, tussen lidstaten ⇒ Wederkerigheid als basis om beleidsvermogen te heroveren www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

Sociaal beleid in een muntunie: puzzels, paradoxen en perspectieven

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Presentatie-Oratie-1-6-2016-finaal

Sociaal beleid in een muntunie:
puzzels,
paradoxen
en perspectieven
Presentatie bij de Oratie die Frank Vandenbroucke uitgesproken
heeft aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op 1 juni 2016
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
Ohlin-rapport, 1956
Het ongelijke Europa
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen staten
(t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
US
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen lidstaten
(t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
EU27
De Europese inkomensladder: een bewegende spreidstand
Roemenië Denemarken
Top
quintiel 4 32% 133%
Top
quintiel 3 30% 140%
Top
quintiel 2 28% 145%
Top
quintiel 1 23% 152%
100% = gemiddelde van de 27 lidstaten
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma?
Wat overheden kunnen: netto-koopkracht van minimumloner
met partner en twee kinderen
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
LU IE AT FI UK DE FR NL DK BE IT SI EL CZ ES SK EE PL HU LT PT LV RO BG
Net disposable income with 2 children Gross wage income
Bron: CSB/MIPI
Europese integratie en sterke nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• De founding fathers geloofden in…
– convergentie door integratie
– cohesie in de convergentie
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid binnen en tussen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Een tragisch dilemma?
– Constructiefouten in de muntunie
In welke mate worden bestedingen gestabiliseerd bij
economische schokken (‘uitgevlakt’)?
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010
Saving
Net taxes and transfers
Factor income and capital
depreciation
Total smoothed
VS:
– Federale inkomensbelastingen &
– Statelijke werkloosheidsverzekering, met
federale omkadering, ondersteuning en uitbreiding
Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper 13/198
EMU: stabiliteit, soevereiniteit en solidariteit
• Waarom worden stabiliseringsmechanismen in muntunies centraal
georganiseerd?
– Spreiding van risico’s (pooling)
– Externaliteiten (vaccinatie)
• Paradox: VSA consolideren zwakke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten
met solidariteitsmechanismen op het federale niveau; EU lukt er niet in
om sterke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten te ondersteunen met
solidariteit op het EU niveau
• Puzzel van:
– Bindende afspraken  soevereiniteit
– Wantrouwen  solidariteit
– Fobie voor moral hazard, die ons verhindert om ze aan te pakken
Perspectieven
• Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is
noodzakelijk
• Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
• Wederkerigheid en grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit:
– non-discriminatie  detachering
– kan iedereen van twee walletjes eten?
Perspectieven
• Een basisconsensus over het Europese sociale model is
noodzakelijk
• Een Europese pijler van sociale rechten?
• Wederkerigheid en grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit:
– non-discriminatie  detachering
– kan iedereen van twee walletjes eten?
Een Europese Sociale Unie
Een Europese Sociale Unie:
• ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties
(op systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie)
• oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene
sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and
means’ bij lidstaten ligt;
• op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model.
⇒ Solidariteit, binnen lidstaten, tussen lidstaten
⇒ Wederkerigheid als basis om beleidsvermogen te heroveren
www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl

Een Europese Sociale Unie

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voorjaar 2016 1
www.uva.nl/amsterdamlezingen 2
23 mei
Een Europese Sociale Unie
Frank Vandenbroucke
Universiteitshoogleraar UvA.
Wat is de sociale betekenis van….
• steden
• regio’s
• natiestaten
• de Europese Unie
?
EU@Amsterdam: visies van de Stedelijke Raad…
• “Als netwerk zouden deze steden zich zelfs verrassend kunnen
ontwikkelen tot een nieuwe stedenfamilie die, meer dan de
huidige tegenstribbelende natiestaten, het Europese project
verder kunnen brengen. (…) Een krachtig verbond tussen de
Europese Unie en met name de grote steden kan de crisis
waarin Europa op dit moment verkeert een gunstige wending
geven.” (Zef Hemel, p. 123)
• “De teerling is geworpen. (….) De gezamenlijke conventie van
grote steden heeft verklaard dat vanaf nu alleen nog zaken
worden gedaan met de Europese Unie en met grote steden
onderling. (….) Daarmee hebben de grote steden de eigen
staten buiten spel gezet.” (Anne van Wageningen, 2031: het
jaar dat de stad de staat ophief, p. 401)
Het is ‘en-en-en-en’
• (en) steden
• (en) regio’s
• (en) natiestaten
• (en) de Europese Unie
Een Europese Sociale Unie
Een Europese Sociale Unie:
• ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op
systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie)
• oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene
sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij
lidstaten ligt;
• op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model.
⇒ Europese landen werken samen in een unie met een expliciete sociale
doelstelling, waarbij zowel nationale als Europese cohesie (‘inclusie’) worden
nagestreefd
Waarom? argumenten EMU / argumenten EU28
Europese integratie en robuuste nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• Een oud debat, cf. Ohlin rapport, 1956
• De founding fathers geloofden dat economische integratie zou leiden tot
opwaartse convergentie tussen de lidstaten en meer sociale cohesie
binnen de lidstaten
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid tussen en binnen lidstaten
Het ongelijke Europa
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen staten
(t.o.v. US gemiddelde)
US
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
0 0,5 1 1,5 2
Ongelijkheid (t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
Mediaan inkomen lidstaten
(t.o.v. EU gemiddelde)
EU27
Europese integratie en robuuste nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• Een oud debat, cf. Ohlin rapport, 1956
• De founding fathers geloofden dat economische integratie zou leiden tot
opwaartse convergentie tussen de lidstaten en meer sociale cohesie
binnen de lidstaten
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid tussen en binnen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Erosie herverdelende kracht welvaartsstaten?
– Toenemende heterogeniteit Europese Unie?
tragisch dilemma?
Europese integratie en robuuste nationale welvaartsstaten:
een tragisch dilemma?
• Een oud debat, cf. Ohlin rapport, 1956
• De founding fathers geloofden dat economische integratie zou leiden tot
opwaartse convergentie tussen de lidstaten en meer sociale cohesie
binnen de lidstaten
• Deze optimistische hypothese lijkt sinds het midden van de jaren 2000
niet meer te kloppen: groeiende ongelijkheid tussen en binnen lidstaten
• Oorzaken?
– Erosie herverdelende kracht welvaartsstaten?
– Toenemende heterogeniteit Europese Unie?
– Weeffouten muntunie
tragisch dilemma?
In welke mate worden bestedingen gestabiliseerd bij
economische schokken (‘uitgevlakt’)?
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
US EMU 1979-1998 EMU 1999-2010
Saving
Net taxes and transfers
Factor income and capital
depreciation
Total smoothed
VS:
– Federale inkomensbelastingen &
– Statelijke werkloosheidsverzekering, met
federale omkadering, ondersteuning en uitbreiding
Furceri & Zdzienicka, The Euro Area Crisis…, IMF Working Paper 13/198
EMU: stabiliteit, soevereiniteit en solidariteit
• Waarom worden stabiliseringsmechanismen in muntunies centraal
georganiseerd?
– Spreiding van risico’s (pooling)
– Externaliteiten (cf. autoverzekering, vaccinatie)
• Paradox: VSA consolideren zwakke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten
met solidariteitsmechanismen op het federale niveau; EU lukt er niet in
om sterke solidariteitsmechanismen in de staten te ondersteunen met
solidariteit op het EU niveau
• Puzzel van:
– Bindende afspraken  soevereiniteit
– Wantrouwen  solidariteit
– Fobie voor moral hazard, die ons verhindert om ze aan te pakken
EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie
• Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme?
 Gemiddeld inkomen EU-migranten > gemiddeld inkomen Amsterdammers
(behalve Oost-Europeanen)
 Beroep op bijstand < beroep op bijstand Amsterdammers (Oost-Europeanen: geen groot verschil)  Armoede: vergelijkbaar met Amsterdammers, behalve Oost-Europeanen EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) • Evenwicht is mogelijk: fair mobility (empowerment; steden) • Non-discriminatie & detachering: samenhangende visie nodig EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) • Evenwicht is mogelijk: fair mobility (empowerment; steden) • Non-discriminatie & detachering: samenhangende visie nodig • Brain waste of brain overflow? Share of people (15-64) with at least upper secondary education (ESDE, chart 16) Share of people with at least upper secondary education working in elementary occupations, 2009-2004 (ESDE, chart 17) EU28: openheid & nationale sociale cohesie • Leidt non-discriminatie tot bijstandstoerisme? • Druk op de onderkant van de arbeidsmarkt? – EU-migratie & externe migratie – Samenhang met (doorgeschoten) flexibilisering – Samenhang met Europese regelgeving (detachering) • Evenwicht is mogelijk: fair mobility (empowerment; steden) • Non-discriminatie & detachering: samenhangende visie nodig • Brain waste of brain overflow? Een Europese Sociale Unie Een Europese Sociale Unie: • ondersteunt nationale welvaartsstaten in sommige van hun sleutelfuncties (op systeemniveau, bv. stabilisatie, belastingconcurrentie) • oriënteert de ontwikkeling van nationale welvaartsstaten met algemene sociale standaarden en doelstellingen, waarbij keuze van ‘ways and means’ bij lidstaten ligt; • op basis van een operationele definitie van het Europese sociale model. ⇒ Europese landen werken samen in een unie met een expliciete sociale doelstelling, waarbij zowel nationale als Europese cohesie (‘inclusie’) worden nagestreefd ⇒ Solidariteit, binnen lidstaten, tussen lidstaten, als wederkerigheid Envoi • “(…) Levin’s emphasis on subsidiarity and local community is important but insufficient. We live within a golden chain, connecting self, family village, nation and world. The bonds of that chain have to be repaired at every point, not just the local one.” • “As in ancient Greece and Rome, local communities won’t survive if the national project disintegrates. Our structural problems are national and global, and require big as well as little reforms.” David Brooks, The Fragmented Society, International Herald Tribune, 21.5.2016 Dank u • Vandenbroucke, ‘De idee van een Europese Sociale Unie’, in Luuk van Middelaar en Philippe Van Parijs (red.), Na de storm. Hoe we de democratie in Europa kunnen redden. Lannoo, Tielt, 2015, pp. 203- 216. • Vandenbroucke and Rinaldi, Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/) • Vandenbroucke, ‘Soevereiniteit, solidariteit en democratie in Europa: de linkse puzzel’, S & D, Jaargang 72, Nummer 4, Augustus 2015, pp. 18-21.

Armoede: een Europees perspectief

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Armoede: een Europees perspectief
Armoede Conferentie van Rotary Noord-Holland
21 mei 2016
Frank Vandenbroucke
Universiteitshoogleraar UvA
Wie is arm?
• De Europese definitie van ‘armoede’: een risico-indicator op basis van
inkomen:
– beschikbaar huishoudinkomen (gestandaardiseerd);
– armoedegrens = 60% van de mediaan van het beschikbaar huishoudinkomen
(gestandaardiseerd) in een land;
• Risico’s:
– kosten voor gezondheid en zorg
– huisvestingskosten
– onverwachte kosten (bv. reparaties)
– schulden
– …
• Kritische bedenkingen
Twee maatstaven van armoede in Nederland
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
Armoede totale bevolking
Lage-inkomensgrens 60% mediaan inkomen
Maatstaf voor relatieve ongelijkheid aan de onderkant
Verankerde armoede = absoluut
Bron: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statline
Armoede, inkomensgroei en ongelijkheid, 2007-2013
Nederland en de andere EU-lidstaten
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Evolutie, met bewegende armoedegrens
Evolutie 2007-2013, met armoedegrens verankerd in 2007
Ongelijkheid groeit
‘Verankerde armoede’ daalt
Ongelijkheid daalt
‘Verankerde armoede’ daalt
Ongelijkheid groeit
‘Verankerde armoede’ groeit
Ongelijkheid daalt
‘Verankerde armoede’ groeit
Bron (deze en volgende slides): Eurostat, EU SILC, eigen bewerkingen; observatiejaren
Jong-oud: snel verschuivende risico’s
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
< 65 65+ Armoede, EU definitie Leeftijdsgroepen EU27 2007 EU 2013 Nederland 2007 Nederland 2013 Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden (bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 NL 2004-07 NL 2010-13 Armoederisico volgens werkintensiteit van het huishouden (bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Armoede, EU definitie Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2004-07 EU27 2010-13 NL 2004-07 NL 2010-13 Uitkeringen / gemiddelde inkomens Werk aan de onderkant Gezinstypes De verdeling van werk over huishoudens polariseert (structuur van de bevolking < 60 jaar) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Zeer hoog Hoog Medium Laag Zeer laag Aandeel in de bevolking Werkintensiteit van het huishouden EU27 2006-08 EU27 2012-13 NL 2006-08 NL 2012-13 Armoede en afkomst (totale bevolking, volgens geboorteplaats) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% Geboren buiten EU28 Geboren in rapporterend land Armoede, EU definitie Geboorteplaats EU28 2013 Nederland 2013 Dank u Vandenbroucke, F. & Rinaldi, D. (2015) Social inequalities in Europe – The challenge of convergence and cohesion. In: Vision Europe Summit Consortium (eds.): Redesigning European welfare states – Ways forward, Gütersloh (http://www.vision-europe-summit.eu/) Cantillon, B., & Vandenbroucke, F. (eds.) (2014), Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction. How successful are European welfare states?, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Alle publicaties: www.econ.kuleuven.be/frankvandenbroucke (vanaf 1 juni: www.frankvandenbroucke.uva.nl)

Automatic stabilizers for the Euro area and the European Social Model

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1 / 6 TRIBUNE 22 SEPTEMBER 2016 AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS FOR THE EURO AREA AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL Frank Vandenbroucke | Adviser at the Jacques Delors Institute and Professor University of Amsterdam he debate on creation automatic stabilizers for Euro area is definitely agenda This tribune focuses relationship between proposals social dimension EU including recent Commission initiative to launch a ‘European Pillar Social Rights’ With Five Presidents’ Report completion European Economic Monetary Union Former Commissioner László Andor inspired by pioneering work German academic Sebastian Dullien advocated organization unemployment benefit scheme as best option stabilizer Meanwhile idea Unemployment Benefit Scheme has been subject various papers conferences 2 The funded thorough broadranging research project its added value feasibility led Centre Policy Studies (CEPS) which final results are be delivered soon 3 Parliament discussing report matter Therefore summary different stabilization in presented Paper Nathalie Julia Spath useful timely (Spath 2016) follows up Spath’s policy paper; it these On national level key feature welfare states; hence there an intrinsic link our conception Eurozone one hand EU’s role other hand: defining design implies respective member states systemic function insurance necessitates careful discussion – I hope show should avoid simplistic dichotomies undue ‘symbolism’ To make this case we first need slightly technical detour paper particularly helpful Three logic models organizes basis three ‘logic models’: Cyclical Shock Insurance (CSI); (EUI); Reinsurance mechanism (for will use ‘Reinsurance’ short-cut) CSI model not related either data or benefits; based relative output gap only caters asymmetric shocks means budgetary transfers does allow issue debt EUI variants scheme: they establish direct relation with In models’ can respond both symmetric building difference twofold First individual citizens who shortterm unemployed receive from fund whilst operates lump sum Second trigger (based deviation current short-term state past trajectory that same state); no specific start disbursing money (any participating receives independent T Automatic growth rate state) discard focus My main argument two sense less clear-cut than might suggest: require significant degree convergence regulation across yet extent required method achieve very imperative linked problem institutional moral hazard associated expression ‘institutional hazard’ refers collective actors Simultaneously introduction ‘trigger’ system game-changer regard Institutional essence occurs when person (or institution) takes more risks because someone else another bears costs those Moral insured manipulate liability insurer incurs influencing frequency and/or importance risk words influenced behavior choice deliberate policies rather being purely exogenous ‘beyond control’ reduced but never totally excluded: inevitable some any context traditional understanding what labels ‘ex ante Is relevant concern stabilizers? answer positive nuanced A intervention systems form would create multi-tiered Europe EU4 playing detailed survey eight countries architecture central levels government assuming ‘insurer’ shows emerges all degrees types solutions (Vandenbroucke Luigjes possibility (whether Reinsurance) become ‘lax’ activation (re)employment large generates obvious hazard; cannot dismissed out caveat about important thinking aware ‘a price pay’ obtain pooling stabilisation Hence objective mitigate trade-off capacity hazard: desirable minimised One conclusion examination experiences their extrapolation minimum requirements defined quality instrument reduce p 35) say order minimize financial must such permanent favour certain impossible: ‘experience rating’ prime example country average net beneficiary scheme5 ; trigger-based also respect explain below But Next (2016) mentions post risks’ she support provided used way effective terms stated aims If aim logical corollary schemes sufficient: maintaining (and reinforcing) political quid pro quo organising benefits depends generosity (notably short term) coverage; like Italy where coverage was traditionally low featured poor comparison see Dolls et al 2012) (short-term) part parcel ‘activation quality’ ‘stabilisation states’ (from now ‘minimum requirements’ short-cut concept) fight forms arising next mechanisms applies Minimum impose Pursuing well-known challenge certainly activation: Employment Strategy Open Method Coordination have testing grounds potential so-called ‘soft law’ domain Much literature exists showing mixed An soft process (the Youth Guarantee example) (not existing today mentioned generic future EMU) seen step towards establishment Rights launched March 7 includes principles perspective convergence: ways share challenge: common normative model; do agree ‘provide clear vision integration EU’ Such sharp dichotomy avoided Admittedly creating Europeans genuine transfer operated high symbolic per se prerequisite far merely ‘technocratic’ exercise: saliency underestimated differ flexibility pursued imposed directly fact becomes co-insurer cashing uniform parallel schemes; coordination hard law allows necessary accommodate diversity view ‘rigid’ solution leads ‘flexible’ administrative complexities underestimated8 easier implement; build processes closely initiatives preliminary outline published underscores economic fighting poverty security observes “[i]n cases due strict eligibility duration Member States well enforcement conditions job search participation active ” proposes following principle: “Action shall include requirement combined adequate sufficient time preserving incentives quick return employment Obviously statement general precise 4 However provides opportunity elaborate upon theme; well-formulated incisive benchmarking performance 9 Arguments presentation operation There indeed difference: if pays basic topped governments constitute rights made conditional exceeds higher percentage formulate precisely: character EU-funded right deemed politically disbursement macro-indicators 10 contrast interfere cashes systems; natural Importantly creates additional possibilities ex For instance deviations historical structural ‘benefit’ (by drawing support); obviously then counteracted experience rating broader set possible features 11 addition sheer complexity difficult protect against (compared pay symbolism Conclusion: Need Analytically compelling; doubt uphill battle today’s We therefore exploration scenarios how fit into developing union Various arguments militate idea: governance offers scope seems complicated Politically reinsurance may true ‘union 2015) Because presupposes definition established Rights; momentum 5 Completing Europe’s J -Cl Juncker close cooperation D Tusk Dijsselbloem M Draghi & Schultz June 2015 monetary equipped already long pedigree; account (2016); listed (2016 footnote 1) encompass econometric legal analyses; publications https://www ceps eu/topics/unemploymentinsurance apply Eurozone; here remainder text ‘EU’ ‘Experience ensures contribution differs record; ‘claw back’ deals long-term (negative) contributions increasing (decreasing) amount CEPS-led consortium EUBS examines detail preference her formulates ‘to increase business cycle convergence’ 17) suggests emphasis prefer define ‘increasing stability’ See http://ec europa eu/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/towards-european-pillar-social-rights_en 8 reason implementation insurmountable differences reinforces my distinction rigidity versus practice new announced Work Programme Communication 21 follow-up Two nuances principle conceive whereby entitled (i) macro-indicator threshold (ii) exceeded generate set-up quite discussed Spath: imposes ‘basic’ (which top up) without necessarily funding time; reduces ‘European’ nature triggers combined: United federal supplements paying American additionally discretionary decisions); however extend thus top-up ‘top-up’ US is) combination individual-level feasible topped-up thinks operate automatically semi-automatic assessment correct automaticity incompatible indicators relatively simple robust empirical ‘political deliberation’ (in supposes) Moreover since frequently many position kind ad-hoc politically-based decision-making surveillance References L “Towards shared Area” IZA Journal Labour 5:10 C Fuest Peichl “Automatic Stabilizers Crisis: vs Europe” Public Economics Vol 96 No 3-4 2012 pp 279-294 N euro area: table? Promises problems cyclical stabilization” 166 Institut – Berlin F “A Union: Unduly Idealistic Inevitable?” Debates Investment Bank September assistance studies Brussel: February 19 rue de Milan 75009 Paris Pariser Platz 10117 info@delorsinstitute eu www delorsinstitute Managing Editor: Yves Bertoncini document reproduced full dual condition meaning distorted source views expressed author(s) reflect publisher held responsible third party Original version © ISSN 2257-5731 IS THERE SUCH THING AS “SOCIAL EUROPE”? Sofia Fernandes David Rinaldi Tribune ACCESS TO BENEFITS MOBILE CITIZENS: “TOURISM” OR MYTH? 168 STABILISERS AREA: WHAT ON TABLE? CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY WHY EUROZONE CAN’T AGREE CONVERGENCE HOW STRUCTURAL REFORMS CAN HELP Anna auf dem Brinke Henrik Enderlein Jörg Haas 165 LABOUR IN CURE CURSE? Paul-Jasper Dittrich 159 -Berlin BLUEPRINT CYCLICAL SHOCK INSURANCE Lukas Guttenberg Jan Spiess Reports 100 2013 COMPLETING ROAD MAP TOWARDS FISCAL UNION EUROPE (REPORT OF ‘TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA GROUP’) Helmut Schmidt Peter Bofinger Laurence Boone Paul De Grauwe Jean-Claude Piris Jean Pisani-Ferry Maria João Rodrigues André Sapir António Vitorino 92 themes

Des stabilisateurs automatiques pour la zone euro et le modèle social européen

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1 / 6 TRIBUNE 22 SEPTEMBRE 2016 DES STABILISATEURS AUTOMATIQUES POUR LA ZONE EURO ET LE MODÈLE SOCIAL EUROPÉEN Frank Vandenbroucke | conseiller à l’Institut Jacques Delors et professeur l’université d’Amsterdam lors que le débat sur la création de stabilisateurs automatiques pour zone euro est clairement l’ordre du jour cette Tribune se concentre relation entre les différentes propositions dimension sociale l’UE notamment l’initiative récente Commission lancer un « Socle européen des droits sociaux » Avec rapport cinq présidents l’achèvement l’Union économique monétaire européenne jour1 Inspiré par publications l’universitaire allemand Sebastian Dullien l’ancien commissaire László Andor a soutenu piste d’un système d’allocations chômage comme meilleure solution créer stabilisateur automatique Par ailleurs l’idée fait l’objet plusieurs articles conférences2 La financé projet recherche vaste approfondi sa valeur ajoutée faisabilité qui été mené Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) dont résultats finaux devraient être publiés prochainement3 Le Parlement envisage publier question conséquent synthèse dans présentée récent paper l’auteur Nathalie Julia Spath utile intervient point nommé (Spath 2016) Cette tribune suite au policy N ; elle ces Au niveau national sont élément clé États-providence il existe donc lien intrinsèque notre conception d’une part rôle politique l’autre : définir nature implique ainsi respectif États membres une fonction systémique essentielle l’assurance-chômage Ce nécessite discussion approfondie – j’espère démontrer devrait éviter certaines dichotomies simplistes symbolisme indu Pour étayer mes propos je me dois premier temps faire léger détour technique lequel particulièrement Trois modèles logiques organise base trois assurance contre chocs conjoncturels (Cyclical Shock Insurance CSI) assurance-chômage (European Unemployment EUI) mécanisme réassurance (pour nous utiliserons terme ») modèle CSI n’est pas lié données ou allocations fondé l’écart production (output gap) relatif sein ne répond qu’aux asymétriques sous forme virements budgétaires Il permet d’émettre dette Les EUI variantes ils établissent directe avec Dans l’organisation l’EUI peuvent gérer fois symé- triques étant donné qu’ils permettent d’accumuler différence double Premièrement cadre citoyens courte durée perçoivent prestation individuelle fonds tandis opère forfaitaires Deuxièmement A Des social 2 reçoivent en déclenchement (fondé actuel l’État membre trajectoire antérieure ce même État membre) aucun particulier prévu avant commence débloquer (toute personne participant perçoit quel soit rythme d’augmentation cet j’écarterai concentrerai Mon principal argument deux sens moins tranchée pourraient laisser entendre nécessitent élevé convergence «régulation»4 participants toutefois l’ampleur requise méthode y parvenir très L’impératif problème l’aléa moral institutionnel associé tant qu’à L’expression aléa référence qu’acteurs institutionnels collectifs mise place change donne concernant d’aléa Aléa produit quand (ou institution) prend plus risques car autre assume coûts L’aléa signifie assurée peut manipuler responsabilité l’assureur encourt influençant fréquence et/ou l’importance risque assuré En d’autres termes influencé comportement choix cas acteurs politiques délibérées lieu d’être purement exogène hors contrôle diminué minutieuse police d’assurance mais jamais totalement exclu certaine mesure inévitable tout contexte analyse traditionnelle appelle ex-ante S’agit-il importante ? réponse oui doit nuancée Une intervention systèmes nationaux d’assurance-chômage donnerait ’régulation niveaux’ (multi-tiered regulation) chô- mage Europe aussi bien l’UE5 étude détaillée huit pays lesquels régulation organisée niveaux centraux gouvernement jouant d’« assureur souligne apparaît tous intensités différents types solutions (Vandenbroucke Luigjes L’éventualité jouissant (que réassurance) deviennent laxistes l’activation chômeurs d’emploi général crée évident complètement éliminé garde réflexion faut savoir prix payer obtenir mutualisation stabilisation Ainsi l’objectif d’atténuer trade-off capacité souhaitables minimisé L’une conclusions examen expériences nationales leur extrapolation exigences minimales définies qualité d’activation seraient instrument important réduire p 35) Cela veut dire qu’il s’agirait seul Afin minimiser dernier plan financier conçu telle sorte permanents faveur certains soient impossibles tarification ajustable (experience rating) exemple visant limiter maximum possibilité moyenne bénéficiaire net système6 égard verrons Mais concentrons-nous d’abord qualitatives auxquelles doivent répondre (2016) évoque ex-post l’aide financière fournie 3 utilisée manière satisfaisante aux objectifs affichés système7 Si conséquence logique adéquate maintenir renforcer) contrepartie dépend générosité (notamment court terme) couverture l’Italie où effective traditionnellement faible présentent médiocre comparaison voir Dolls al 2012) (de durée) font partie intégrante résumer (nous désormais l’expression concept) essentielles lutter formes apparaissant mécanismes financiers nécessité d’exigences vaut tels définis imposeraient L’objectif sociales défi connu certainement concerne stratégie l’emploi ouverte coordination ont permis tester potentiel soft law (mesures non-contraignantes) domaine De nombreuses études publiées mitigés Un processus souple effectif (la garantie jeunesse pourrait exemple) (qui n’existe aujourd’hui évoqué géné- riques l’avenir l’UEM) considéré première étape vue d’établir Lancé mars 20168 socle comporte également principes perspective Convergence sociale: moyens L’EUI comportent enjeu davantage partir normative commune partage l’opinion vision claire l’intégration dichotomie Certes direct Européens véritable individuels géré aurait forte symbolique soi Toutefois pré- alable serait loin exercice technocrate sous-estimer force diffèrent flexibilité lesquelles réalisée imposée directement qu’un devient co-assureur verse uniforme parallèle existants législation admet tienne compte diversité nationale prestations plutôt rigide offre flexible complexité administrative sousestimée9 simple mettre œuvre s’appuyer étroitement liée récentes initiatives telles 4 ébauche préliminaire publiée pauvreté sécurité L’ébauche indique [d]ans nombre bénéficiaires raison critères stricts d’admissibilité l’application conditions participation soutien actif sujet préoccupation propose principe suivant mesures soutenir meurs associer l’obligation active adéquates suffisante permettre emploi incitations nécessaires retour rapide maintenues toute évidence s’agit déclaration générale stabilisatrice précise minimale l’occasion développer thème généraux formulés liés évaluation comparative pertinente performance domaine10 Arguments présentation fondée effectivement si complétées gouvernements européens constituent subordonnés dépasse certain seuil son supérieur pourcentage précis caractère droit individuel versement subordonné macroindicateurs11 revanche n’interfère individuelles effectue vers caractéristique naturelle Qui marges supplémentaires s’il l’écarts ayant structurel n’en profiteront (en obtenant d’aide l’UE) évidemment alors contrebalancé série réduisent institutionnel12 difficile protéger (par transfert destination Conclusion besoin minutieux l’analyse arguments rationnels forts sans doute rude combat l’Europe d’aujourd’hui examiner soin scénarios analyser quelle s’intégrer large union Divers militent idée gouvernance non seulement grande marge manœuvre atténuer semble compliquée Politiquement fidèle qu’une État-providence 2015) Sachant qu’elle présuppose établi donner nouvel élan 5 Bibliographie L «Towards shared unemployment insurance in the Euro Area» IZA Journal of Labour 5:10 M C Fuest Peichl Automatic Stabilizers and Economic Crisis: US vs Public Economics Vol 96 No 3-4 2012 pp 279-294 J Quels euro?» Paper 166 Institut – Berlin juin F Social Union: Unduly Idealistic or Inevitable? Debates 7 Investment Bank Institute septembre 2015 «Institutional hazard multi-tiered regulation assistance benefits activation summary eight country case studies» Brussel: février Compléter Rapport -Cl Juncker étroite coopération D Tusk Dijsselbloem Draghi & Schultz L’idée l’union doive dotée commun nouvelle rappel historique pertinents indiqués (2016 note bas page 1) comprennent analyses économétriques juridiques encore consulter premières https://www ceps eu/topics/unemployment-insurance L’auteur utilise «régulation» décrire règlements légaux administratifs s’appliqueraient euro;dans utilisons UE» abréviation «zone euro» «tarification ajustable» garantit contribution versée varie matière chômage;un possible récupération (claw back) porte contributions nettes positives négatives) long augmentant (diminuant) montant verser consortium dirigé CEPS examine détail privilégie final établit objectif d’«augmenter cycle économique» 17) laisse l’accent principalement Je préfère établir «renforcer stabilité» 8 Voir http://ec europa eu/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/towards-european-pillar-social-rights_en 9 nécessaire afin composer différences insurmontables renforce mon distinction rigidité pratique celle logiques» présentés 10 initiative benchmarking annoncée programme travail communication 21 suivi 11 Deux nuances importantes concevoir (i) financées macro-indicateur plafond (ii) dépassé créerait outil assez différent impose spécifique détaillé (qu’ils compléter) nécessairement financer réduit actuels combinés États-Unis fédéral complète versant américains (et décisions discrétionnaires) complément étatiques complété complémentaire (ce américain nature) combinaison option réalisable présenté «de base» 12 considère fonctionner automatiquement semi-automatique correcte cela poserait Cependant l’automaticité incompatibles indicateurs repose établis empirique relativement solide délibération politique» supplémentaire (contrairement suppose) pouvant fréquemment nombreux d’en bénéficier permettra type prises ad hoc observons surveillance budgétaire ISSN 2257-5731 L’EUROPE SOCIALE EXISTE-T-ELLE Sofia Fernandes David Rinaldi L’ACCÈS AUX PRESTATIONS SOCIALES LES CITOYENS MOBILES DE L’UE TOURISME OU FANTASME n° 168 QUELS MOBILITÉ TRANSFRONTALIÈRE COMMENT RÉFORMES STRUCTURELLES PEUVENT PERMETTRE À TROUVER UN ACCORD SUR CONVERGENCE Anna auf dem Brinke Henrik Enderlein Jörg Haas 165 DU TRAVAIL DANS REMÈDE FLÉAU Paul-Jasper Dittrich 159 UNE ASSURANCE CONTRE CHOCS CONJONCTURELS Lukas Guttenberg Jan Spiess Études Rapports 100 2013 PARACHEVER L’EURO FEUILLE ROUTE VERS UNION BUDGÉTAIRE EN EUROPE (RAPPORT GROUPE TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA) Helmut Schmidt Peter Bofinger Laurence Boone Paul Grauwe Jean-Claude Piris Jean Pisani-Ferry Maria João Rodrigues André Sapir António Vitorino 92 Sur mêmes thèmes… 19 rue Milan 75009 Paris Pariser Platz 10117 info@delorsinstitute eu www institutdelors Directeur publication Yves Bertoncini • reproduction totalité extraits autorisée condition dénaturer mentionner source opinions exprimées n’engagent leur(s) auteur(s) L’Institut saurait rendu responsable l’utilisation tiers Traduction l’anglais Charlotte Laigle

Social benefits and cross-border mobility: let’s return to consistent principles

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EU news and policy
debates across
languages
The relationship between
the posting debate and the
Brexit debate
By Frank Vandenbroucke
(updated: 13.jul.2016)
>>>
Polish construction
workers. UK, 2005.
[Ryan Poplin/Flickr]
DISCLAIMER: All opinions in this column reflect the views of the author(s), not of EurActiv.com PLC.
The posting of workers and the issues regarding social security need to be looked at from a shared perspective, writes Frank
Vandenbroucke. This op-ed summarises a paper published by the Notre Europe Jacques Delors Institute in Paris.
Frank Vandenbroucke is social affairs adviser at the Jacques Delors Institute and is a professor at the University of Amsterdam.
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY: LET’S RETURN TO CONSISTENT PRINCIPLES
Given the outcome of the referendum, Cameron’s ‘deal’ with the EU is history, including the exception he negotiated with
regard to the payment of British social benefits to non-nationals. We can now return to consistent principles. Consider the issue
of benefits for non-nationals and the posting of workers. These debates have been separated. We should approach them from
a single, principled perspective.
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN SOCIAL POLICY AND POSTING OF WORKERS
The EU is built on non-discrimination: Belgian social policy cannot be different for a Polish citizen in Belgium and a Belgian
citizen in Belgium. This does not mean that a European citizen can enter Belgium without means of existence and immediately
apply for social assistance: European legislation does not impose such generosity, at least not for those who are economically
inactive.
But a Polish citizen working in Belgium enjoys the same social rights as the Belgian citizen working in Belgium: he is integrated
into the Belgian solidarity circle. That principle supports an ideal of European citizenship. It also justifies the fact that the Polish
worker’s employer pays the same social security contributions to Belgian social security as the Belgian worker’s employer, i.e.
that we do not tolerate competition between the Polish and the Belgian social security system on Belgian territory.
Competition between the Polish and the Belgian social security system is exactly what happens in the context of ‘posting’: a
Polish worker who is ‘posted’ in Belgium remains integrated in Polish social security. Thus, posting is an exception to a
foundational principle of the EU. In order to accommodate work in other countries on short-term projects, such an exception is
needed, a fortiori if one wants to develop an integrated market for services.
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The scope for this exception has become large and there are problems of inspection and control. Therefore, member states
such as France, the Netherlands and Belgium, ask for reform. The European Commission launched a proposal to reform the
Posted Workers Directive in March, but it has been blocked by 11 (mainly Central and Eastern European) member states.
Posting is more than an exception to principles of social security coordination. It is an exception to a broader notion of
integration into the solidarity circle of the member state in which one works, both in terms of wages, working conditions and
social security contributions and entitlements. The challenge is to find a balance between the need for an integrated market in
services (for which posting is necessary) on one hand, and the foundational role of that principle on the other hand.
WHICH LOGIC SHOULD GUIDE MEMBER STATES IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY?
There was a certain ‘logic’ in the British position: the UK was unconcerned by the posting debate, but wanted to safeguard its
dual achievement of relatively high net disposable incomes for low-wage workers and relatively low labour costs for British
employers (via so-called ‘in-work benefits’), yet, safeguard it only for UK citizens. With the UK-EU deal off the table, we should
return to a more consistent logic, based on a true sense of reciprocity among member states. That logic was lost over the last
few months.
Member states such as Poland typically want as little limitations as possible on posting of workers (since a liberal posting regime
is economically beneficial for them); simultaneously, they want as little limitations as possible on the principle of nondiscrimination
in social policy for non-posted workers (since such limitations imply a social relapse for Polish citizens). Thus,
they entertain two positions that are at odds with each other, but that seem to serve their short-term interests best.
The Dutch government, to take an opposite example, has put the reform of posting high on the agenda during the recent Dutch
EU Presidency. Simultaneously, the Dutch prime minister voiced sympathy with Cameron’s agenda when he tabled it. There
was no consistent logic in these statements.
Suppose, in contrast, that the Dutch government would address the Polish government in the following way: “We want to give
Polish citizens, working and contributing to social security in the Netherlands, full access to our social benefits. But, please,
understand that we do not want to see our social system undermined by excesses in the application of posting.” If such would
be the negotiating stance of mature welfare states, they may strike a better deal with less developed welfare states on both
issues (posting, non-discrimination), compared to a situation in which deviations from the non-discrimination principle and
uncontrollable posting proliferate. In the latter scenario, everybody will lose.
The debates on social security coordination and posting have been separated, but member states should consider them from
the same, principled perspective. On that basis, it is possible to find an adequate balance between the need for an integrated
market in services and the principle that mobile workers should be integrated into the solidarity circle of the member state
where they work.
This op-ed summarises a paper published by the Notre Europe Jacques Delors Institute in Paris.
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Responsibility, well-being, information, and the design of distributive policies

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1 RESPONSIBILITY WELL-BEING INFORMATION AND THE DESIGN OF DISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES Frank Vandenbroucke‡ ABSTRACT The model developed in this paper admits a systematic discussion of the normative rationale behind use two distributive instruments: negative income taxation creating an unconditional basic on one hand and wage subsidies other integrates opposite conceptions personal responsibility (whether or not we are responsible for our propensity to work labour market) into single framework Thus can compare these systematically define conditions practical convergence between policies they indicate This also illustrates how optimal theory may proceed when utilities considered ordinal interpersonally comparable requires definition objective notion individual well-being I incorporate “time nonmarket activity” shows alternative choices with regard inclusion weighing non-market Rawlsian basket primary goods affect prescription More generally it posttransfer reward scheme government proposes is used illustrate idea defended by Fleurbaey et al that responsibility-sensitive egalitarian justice imposes principle natural Given simplifying assumptions will establish second-best regimes excluding corner solutions each conception set instruments one-to-one correspondence principles Hence given there unique which yields neutral i e “neutral” official then study “egalitarian earnings subsidy scheme” proposed White (1999) assess related (1997) Van Parijs reciprocity According implies rejection be complementary However under certain demands earned only fund so has funded (possibly together expenditures) capital tax available “personal dividends” ‡ based Chapter 3 my D Phil thesis (Vandenbroucke 1999) am grateful Anthony Atkinson Marc Erik Schokkaert Frans Spinnewyn Tom Puyenbroeck Philippe comments earlier versions INTRODUCTION With employment policy welfare reform large degree consensus among makers scholars taxes benefits must lead situation poor individuals (or their families) face very high marginal rates take up job hours increase Benefit systems too selective beset “inactivity traps” discouraging market participation low-skilled workers In academic research various proposals “basic income” “negative taxation” put forward remedy such inactivity traps Obviously approaches incentive problem low earners possible as (i) topping skilled workers’ purchasing power credits (ii) increasing net pay lowering social security contributions (iii) supporting sufficiently minimum wages selectively subsidizing employers These reflect technical differences but more fundamental approach Therefore useful first from vantage point examining underpinning without reference particular problems created benefit economies involuntary unemployment present (which mutually exclusive): mathematical objective1 call “advantage”) except special case what follows “objective” “interpersonally comparable” interchangeably advantage defined purely way violations Pareto (a judged better whereas every agent worse-off his view) justification cannot pursue here Note propose depends upon judgement sense “subjective” 2 view improves Rawls’s nonRawlsian “incentive policy”) allows comparison qua information availability redistributive efficiency: (1) taxation; (2) form thus universal responsibilitysensitive (see references footnote 5) look allocation rules fully compensate influence differentials non-responsible characteristics over agents’ let operate argument owes its appeal neutrality vis-à-vis preferences akin liberal ideal “neutrality fact do think respect Vandenbroucke 1999 pp 40-41) Yet provides benchmark versus (Sections 14 15) presents simple world action completely determined answering three questions: 1) responsibility? 2) citizens? 3) (hence feasible)? simplicity review due both concerning economic environment government’s Within specific strictest One specify axioms specifying See Rawls 1993 p 193 aim” (advantage) citizens’ (ESS) prove White’s ESS result optimisation exercise specification solution equality On basis demonstrates trade-off level rate moves holds people shift ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT Each population P characterized vector ( ) [ 1] ] L w Î ´ ¥ ³ 0 Individuals have range skills levels associated A citizen’s productivity he earn per unit paid 4 marketplace putting best rewarded assume citizens always choose kind rewards So neither nor citizen (w whose working time earns wL We metric = most productive An individual’s human “internal endowment” external endowments houses land invested economy value assets represent him expressed equivalent flow average yield need reinvested order maintain redistributed any side-effect “per capita dividend” construe individually owned unequally distributed dividends assumption highly abstract no doubt unreal adjudicate philosophical debate divide activity outside (e g eating organizing household caring children sleeping resting leisure factor characterizes preference ordering Individual utility functions noncomparable e) represented strictly monotonically transformation f(Ue) o eL U Y – whereby disposable parameter Lo sets standard maximal might chosen Since maximum crazy workaholic would if were maximize (Maximizing expression (ÞY L) postulate humanly leaves indifferent (i substitution indifference curve by: 5 ¶ If small values highly: she prepared forgo much buy factors independently variance s Concerning distribution dividend data relevant assume: “(w )Î : Þ implying partitioned “productivity types” “preference Tw* having same w* “type”: {(w } * Pe* e* “tranche”: continuously infinite number 6 GOVERNMENT’S POLICY STANCE Recall aim focus dimensions stance: responsibility; well-being; simplify defining gives absolute priority position worst-off dimension want distinguish branches justice: “RAWLS” activity; “RESPO” ultra-simple (RAWLS RESPO short) consider people’s possession circumstance (say because results history gifts bequests could influence) second postulated Section incomparable RAWLS hold although does reflects John thinks happiness mainstream exposition out “work effort”4 some “advantage” Below continuum depending “burden work” significant simplification obtains “impartial” aggregation method utilitarian flavour explain following sections Finally about determines objectives presuppose planning rejects “distribution according effort” (1971 312) general ends goals effort reveals deep tension within system explained Cohen 1989 912-916 But stick 7 agency perfect statistical behaviour As transfer authority regimes: Regime T: gross apply tax; S: T S allow imagine third regime F orderings lump sum transfers first-best 16) AXIOMATIC APPROACH: TWO PRINCIPLES FOR EGALITARIAN GOVERNMENT far suggested descriptive account means intervention Alternatively formulate axiomatically should satisfy To able design specified:5 a) assigning differential make own b) compensation prevail wherever absent them strength It been shown impossible reconcile strongest implement weaken comprehensive axiomatic test check performance axioms: (1995a 1995b 1998); Bossert (1996); de gaer Maniquet (1996a 1996b) 8 reward: “If all identical traits difference pre- resources society” Let us axiom “No Redistribution Uniform Non-Responsible traits” (NRUNR) For example branch “non-responsible traits”; hence NRUNR redistribution five distinct specifications stated follows: b1) Solidarity: profile changes either agent’s deteriorates”(Fleurbaey 1998 214) Solidarity anonymity entail equality: b2) advantage” “Equal Advantage Equal Responsibility” (EAER) consequences held compensated deemed Then EAER who different and/or end obtain maximin version (b2) appropriate: b3) group lowest ” “Maximin (MAER) MAER “reference concerned testing described variable “e” Consider ê criterion policy: 9 b4) advantage”6 “EAERê”: Responsibility again weakened to: b5) MAERê”: Reference ê” MAERê Some limited domain environments show (notably shape “official” aggregated collective choice) “neutral Or conclusion words once determine underlying “conditional egalitarianism” 10 SECOND-BEST INSTRUMENTS scenarios intervenes four Instrument 1: flat t constant term B: amount equal twL B > tax) 2: c ruled disincentive effects plays trivial role puts interpretation proper perspective especially (Section 3: proportional spends work: works receives sL instrument chooses income: (3) + [(1-t)w s]L (1- c)p 4: importantly governments supports education public spending E scenario (t E) balanced budget constraint function calculated B(t below calculation c) Clearly build complete endogenous Education impact Moreover normally influences deterministic nature 11 deny even adequate essential “circumstances choice” background indeed matter “choice” choice educational interacts variables directly revenue indirectly via E’s since complex try simply suppose represents important included presentation neglect necessity purposes than CONSTRAINTS ON confronted constraints: labour-supply Apart impose limit taxation: £ Spending covered current L(w e; supply response is: (4) )[ ò ; wpe f cp dp dw 12 density joint simplified considerably now (U L)) (5) maximization response: (6) s) [w( t) s] 1- properties g(w e): (7) separable (w)g independence distributions write: (8) (w) (e) Both separability (and expressions derived it) features Using equation derive (4): (9) eLo [t( t)( )+ )ws ]+ 13 equations follow (equal often occurs property underpins results: constraints positive (income taxation) (an supplement pre-tax earnings); worked) integrated schedule) poll raise money constrains disincentives never respond labour”; incentives 4) entails boundaries: (10a) “s “t “e wÎ[0 1]: e;t “lower bound”; (10b) wÎ “upper bound” behavioural boil down (11a) (11b) Equation total “wage” type Together searches illustrated Figure 17 FIGURE Figuur course add dashed line s* pays low-paid relatively technique avoid training disincentives) DEFINING INDIVIDUAL ADVANTAGE optimize allowing interpersonal All examples graphs 44 1344 -wL Upper bound® ¬ Lower bound 15 imply cases exists exception rather rule Suppose (12) d takes considers burden precisely monetary balance Work mixed blessing: brings (“participating “developing capital” “structuring one’s life” burdens (“having less family” “less leisure” etc non-monetary perceives extent extra keep person’s unchanged (13) conceives legitimate (14) “legitimate” wellbeing “desert” “public indifference” specified combinations income; see impacts convenient elements / rewritten: 16 (15) gL stance well-being: increases “burden”attached decreases ® measure terms instance traditional measures wealth (The well-known highlighted Musgrave 1974) Â(w maximizes write as: (16) Â ÷ ø ö ç è æ (deliberate) similarity indirect Ve non-comparable): (17) V Our features: First ½ non-decreasing ” “pity” someone talented former harder latter Second else e-factor lower There reason why tranche members Tw difficult predict whole Two distinguished: (wL pL Indeed arg min concave OBJECTIVES extreme inequality aversion (18) tsc max (19) excludes minimal assigned ¥: deems “lazy” drops exclude possibility those keen intermediate 18 implementation Roemer8 Ideally like equalizes (more maximins) across types done: maximizations simultaneously performed at Roemer weighted advantages where weight frequency entire states looking Rawlsian; tranches giving consideration Martinez They argue applying “worst” option good (Assume uniformly looks contour yet another area intersection type; smallest open person9 My (1994 Part II; 1996a 279ff gaer’s methodology (1996) (1998) Type Approach 19 Roemer’s RESPOobjective: (20) applied RESPO-objective: (21) person belonging TwL defines sets: frontiers cross (as (22) Integrating formula RAWLS: (23) þ ý ü î í ì RA RESPO: (24) eg RE properties: 20 i) 1]; [0 ú Í û ù ë é x pities lazy crucially: ii) (g :s < ;s Now using (25) { “a” short-cut describing captures overall emphasise mean things Either transition application (25’) Vê Uê 2a (One note though 21 programme summarized start formulated (cf Fleurbaey’s egalitarianism”) advantage: picking maximizing Roemer-Van programmes (eq 22) link did Starting requirement comparability: suffices optimization underscores crucial analysis notions supposed know) search policy; nevertheless presented irrelevant Secondly whatever RESPO) exogenous reduce objective: (26) Q st -a obviously And pick reduces 22 (27) Q(t ts GENERAL SOLUTION (for T(s) s; S(t) t: (28) (29) Appendix graphical sketched substitute 26-27) multiply (1-a) delete new program: (30) )] W Wt +a 1-a convex coefficient (except awL 0; equivalent) 23 iii) larger 1; iv) (31) verified case: (s (1 Appendix) Special When additional introduced s*) bites have: (32) eq 28 T(s)) used: (33) elasticity similar (with effect elasticity) 24 (34) (when 0) changing adjusting (equation 9) accordingly Maximizing boils adjusted) Throughout rest TRACING OPTIMAL SCENARIOS INCREASING TO Optimal track describe (always 7) s(a) t( (excluding 0)10 Solving t(a) v(a)/D(a) r(a)/D(a) D(a) calculate (eliminating D²(a) derivatives): r dr v dv dt ds ¹ inter alea uniform straight (a) (35) t(0) s(0) determinant 4[(1-a) boundaries permissible (the lines parallel) forming slope linear combination section 25 S(1) further reached movement stops trace depicted 3A (where presume ao) segment smaller (35’) )( q 3a: rarely page interval RE(g) 1/3 moreover vertical (this condition (iv) 30) a0 a1 26 already indicated long say that: higher (other equal); working” increases) At starting (ao) heavy measurement (top right) all; measuring “ reverses Figures 3B 3C involve change 27 FIGURES – Figuren 3B-3C rewrite (regime T) environment) J inequality: divided variation levels: (36) written:13 (32’) ws ' J’ (33’) “Laffer” turning shifts Laffer towards zero aJ “inequality” measured J) RESPO14 changes15 words: preferences; enhanced earning stimulate COMPENSATION; CONDITIONS EQUALITY statement clear constellation (Maximin ê) operates satisfied Excluding 29 program stronger EAERê automatically when16 aw REWARD: NEUTRALITY NRUNR: Resources tw means: Ù inspecting (i-iv) Condition written: 30 easy ½: reconciled From definitions a-functions derive: Û presupposes extremely biassed Otherwise difficulty identification simulate draw SN t” setting gives: (37) N 2w constrained unconstrained illustration made TN drawing 31 CONVERGENCE BETWEEN Superficially “egalitarian” fewer redistributes “superficially” egalitarianism misleading implies; orderings” Nonetheless interesting examine converge prescriptions choosing RA(g) s): analyse limiting fairly evident: Also answer straightforward inspection (a=½) 32 inversely compound becomes distinction relative (constant) somewhat bluntly: applies believes acts wherein increasingly unequal innate talent important17 (A indicates BASIC INCOME? iso-B curves BT(s) B-maximizing) BS(t) when: (38) BT Cf 41 33 (39) 2t BS left reaches (When “slope BT” refer dependent variable; )/ leads (40) t)w (B 34 declines until crossing region to) since: 35’ area; vertical) go (½ Any departure BT; Formally T(s*) (s*) loosening introducing exist before) Loosening travel along constellations (large know whether theoretical Three conclusions drawn: irreducible conflict (given g) RAWLS18 demand 35 operational “real freedom rule” discussed van der Veen (1997 1998) context broader (1995) freedom” ability (independent actually wants do) suggests concept (instead actual preferences): “a real said improve unambiguously expands added none deleted process someone’s contain non-overlapping income-leisure compared 276-277) makes pair (defined corresponding Consequently advantage19 Sugden 36 STATE INCOME Would constraints)? Cases (29’) (9’) [s(w s)]+ Assume intervening cash residual after necessary expenditures generated generate sufficient cover achieve policy) deduce (using equality) government” 37 (different 11) “optimal policy”; interaction rewriting calculations:20 [s E] grant part guarantee 0: 0); Again calculations model: w; rewritten 38 “RECIPROCITY” VERSUS receive pay) pound potential society’s He ethically attractive “when proportionality incomes community morally appropriate ‘take (White 612) contribution criticises Parijs’s “reciprocity” shed light seen planner society (all population’s function: (41) Wi Hi 1+ Yi after-tax he/she happens worked dollar (42) “T* stands reasonable full year Ti 39 period Where T* si positive; tax)” “si (43) ss vindicated: “maximum power” scheme; matches proposal exactly (To 43 42 says self-interested defeat (no subsidy) vindicated deeper foundations presumed rely “social cooperation” production justify 1997) (Recall incomplete priori postulates (apart exceptions) grounds pointing making cooperation reply convincing (forthc implicitly justified non-zero unless accept 40 (b) violation redistributing “productivist” redistribute violating achieved permits raises issues (does exist?) intergenerational (what “gross” interest future generations?) stretching meaning reenters back door: allowed away generations was previous COMPARISON EFFICIENCY draws “advantage frontiers” (type 40% 2; dividends; education) X-axis high-productivity tranches) Y-axis low-productivity depict highest attain frontier 6: Note: TT SS FF II III reach 45° Although (in example) gain efficiency seems renders slight lowproductive cost drastic loss high-productive efficiency-gain introduction come surprise Envelope Theorem: life suboptimal politically higher) Average Low-Productivity High-Productivity CONCLUSIONS unified case21 reward” schemes advantage22 policy” understand play “pure” Assuming tax-only constitutes finds literature) zero-productivity eliminates independent matched entertained White) proves embodies “dividends” sources linked APPENDIX: graphically (29): 7A 25; 7B iso-Q marks & (Q (Q¯ Q- t# s# 45 limits s(- cf rapidly upwards slowly crosses 11b) namely satisfied: bite 85 8A; 8B variables) 8A 8A-8B upper isoQ intersects expression: (A1) Iso-Q 46 sub-optimal 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY BOSSERT Walter FLEURBAEY “Redistribution compensation” Social Choice Welfare 343-355 VAN DE GAER Dirk SecondBest Compensation Cahiers du THEMA 9607 March COHEN Gerald (1989) “On Currency Egalitarian Justice” Ethics 99 906- (1995a) opportunity outcome?” Economics Philosophy 25-55 (1995b) “Equality responsibility” European Economic Review 683-689 individuals” LASLIER JeanFrançois GRAVEL Nicolas TRANNOY Alain (eds Freedom New perspectives Routledge London 206-234 MANIQUET François (1996a) “Cooperative Production: Comparison Bounds” Games Behaviour 200- 208 (1996b) “Fair skills: No Envy Mathematical Sciences 71-93 Income Taxation: Ordinal (Very preliminary version) MUSGRAVE R (1974) uncertainty trade-off” Quarterly Journal Vol 88 November 625-632 (1971) Theory Justice Oxford University Press (1993) Political Liberalism Columbia York ROEMER (1994) resources” Perspectives Essays Philosophical Cambridge 115-196 Theories Distributive Harvard Mass Mechanism Implementing Egalitarianism FARINA Francesco HAHN VANNUCCI Stefano Rationality Clarendon 142-158 48 Equality Opportunity SUGDEN Robert Measuring Real Paper conference Parijs's Warwick May MARTINEZ Michel SCHOKKAERT Intergenerational Mobility Center Studies Discussion Series DPS 98 Leuven April VANDENBROUCKE Open Society Incentives University; forthcoming Springer Verlag DER VEEN "Debate Basic Comment Brian Barry" 274- 286 "Real Reciprocity Competing Views Unconditional Income" vol (March) PARIJS “Reciprocity Justification XLV 327-330 WHITE Stuart “Liberal Exploitation Case 312-326 “The Earnings Subsidy Scheme” British Science 601-622 49 CONVERSION FIGURES: NEW VERSION THESIS FIG fig (dashed ao instead 4A 4B 5A 5B